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STOP AND FRISK IN A CONCEALED CARRY WORLD
Shawn E. Fields
Abstract: This Article confronts the growing tension between increasingly permissive
concealed carry firearms legislation and police authority to conduct investigative stops and
protective frisks under Terry v. Ohio. For decades, courts upheld stops based on nothing more
than an officer’s observation of public gun possession, on the assumption that anyone carrying
a gun in public was doing so unlawfully. That assumption requires reexamination. All fifty
states and the District of Columbia authorize their citizens to carry concealed weapons in
public, and forty-two states impose little or no conditions on the exercise of this privilege. As
a result, officers and courts can no longer reasonably assume that “public gun possession”
equals “criminal activity.”
Courts and scholars have begun addressing discrete aspects of this dilemma, and this
Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it corrects the oft-repeated
misconception that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence has
altered the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion standard. Second, it articulates the need
for a “gun possession plus” reasonable suspicion standard to initiate a Terry stop for a
suspected firearms violation. Third, it defends the right of officers to conduct automatic frisks
of suspects after a lawfully-initiated stop when firearms are present, in recognition of the
inherent and unique dangerousness of these weapons. The Article concludes with a recognition
of the risks presented by a proposed “automatic frisk” regime, particularly for over-policed
communities of color. In doing so, it suggests law enforcement would be well served to
consider community policing alternatives to stop and frisk that respect the rights of firearms
carriers in marginalized communities while protecting officers on the beat.
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INTRODUCTION
Few doctrines have strained the interpretive bounds of the Fourth
Amendment or influenced the relationship between police officers and
civilians more than “stop and frisk.”1 “The Fourth Amendment was once
considered a monolith,” where “‘[p]robable cause’ had a single meaning”
and “‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ were all-or-nothing concepts.”2 But when
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Terry v. Ohio3 that a police officer could
“seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons”4 on
nothing more than reasonable suspicion,5 the Court “broke [this monolith]
entirely.”6 In the half century since Terry, the controversial practice has
1. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 261
(6th ed. 2013) (“In terms of the daily activities of the police, as well as the experiences of persons ‘on
the street,’ there is probably no Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case of greater practical impact
[than Terry v. Ohio].”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (1988) (“The . . . challenges of Fourth
Amendment interpretation are formidable standing alone, and the Court’s decision[] in . . . Terry v.
Ohio ha[s] compounded the difficulty.”).
2. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 388 (6th ed., West 2017) (quoting DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 261).
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id. at 30.
6. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 388; see also Sundby, supra note 1, at 385 (“Faced with
novel Fourth Amendment questions, the Court in . . . Terry turned to a broad reasonableness standard
and an ill-defined balancing test for the immediate solutions . . . . significantly undermin[ing] the role
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become synonymous with the beat tactics of the country’s largest
metropolitan police force,7 exacerbated rifts between zealous (or worse)
officers and distrustful communities of color,8 and diminished the oncedominant warrant requirement to second-class Fourth Amendment status.9
The “stop and frisk” standard is deceptively easy to describe, if nearly
impossible to apply with any precision. As the Court explained in Terry,
an officer may (1) seize an individual for a brief investigatory stop upon
“reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be
involved in criminal activity,”10 and (2) frisk the outer clothing of the
individual for weapons if she has “reason to believe that [s]he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual.”11 This “reasonable suspicion”
standard necessary to justify a stop and frisk is low: “‘considerably less
than proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’
than is necessary for probable cause.”12

of probable cause and set[ting] the stage for long-term expansion of the reasonableness balancing test
without proper justification or limits.”).
7. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that a
sevenfold increase in stop and frisks “was achieved by pressuring commanders at Compstat meetings
to increase the number of stops,” and that “commanders, in turn, pressured mid-level managers and
line officers . . . by rewarding high stoppers and denigrating or punishing those with lower numbers
of stops”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness
of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–20 (2014) (providing a “historical
account of NYC stop and frisk”).
8. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 263 (“[T]here can be no gainsaying that when the
police forcibly stop persons on the street to question them or to conduct full or cursory searches,
highly sensitive issues of racial profiling . . . come to the fore.”); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue
Encounters” – Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 255 (“[P]olice encounters involving black men contain a combination of fear,
distrust, anger and coercion that make these encounters unique and always potentially explosive.”);
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1275–76 (1998) (“When one examines the history and modern exercise of police
‘stop and frisk’ practices, the old adage ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same,’ aptly
describes the experience of many black men when confronted by police officers.”).
9. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016)
(arguing that scholars are “incorrect” to presume that “reasonableness—and not a warrant
requirement—lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment,” instead distinguishing that
“[r]easonableness does lay at the heart of the Fourth Amendment, but what it meant was that, outside
of apprehending a known felon, a warrant would be required”). Like Professors Maclin, Donohue,
and Sundby, I harbor grave reservations about the soundness of Terry and its progeny. But for
purposes of this Article, I recognize the established precedent of Terry and make suggestions within
that existing stop and frisk framework.
10. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011).
11. Id.
12. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“[R]easonable
suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”).
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In large part because of this low and malleable “reasonable suspicion”
standard, the permissible scope of the stop and frisk practice has expanded
significantly since Terry. While Terry involved an on-the-street stop of a
would-be robber casing an establishment with a gun bulging from his
coat,13 since then the Court has upheld an officer’s ability to frisk
individuals stopped for minor traffic violations who are suspected of
carrying weapons,14 search car compartments within “the lunge area” of
the stopped individual,15 arrest suspects for refusing to affirmatively
identify themselves during a Terry stop,16 and initiate a stop based on a
mistake of law.17
But in the last decade, this near linear expansion of pre-arrest
investigative powers has been stymied from an unlikely source—the
Second Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions
recognizing an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms for personal protection18—and concurrent increase in the number of
states authorizing concealed and open carry of firearms in public19—has
forced a reexamination of traditional stop and frisk jurisprudence.20
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1968).
14. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (“[M]ost traffic stops . . . resemble, in duration
and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry. . . . [T]raffic stops are especially
fraught with danger to police officers.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
15. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983) (holding that the principles of Terry
“compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile . . . is
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief . . . that the suspect is dangerous and the
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons”); United States v. Morris, No. 95-50158, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 45162, at *2 (5th Cir. May 2, 1996) (citing Michigan v. Long to uphold officer’s
protective search of “the ‘lunge area’” of a suspect’s car for weapons).
16. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 178, 189 (2004) (but explaining that
“an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop”).
17. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (observing that the
“reasonable suspicion” standard allows for officers to make reasonable mistakes of fact regarding
criminality or dangerousness, and finding that “[t]here is no reason . . . why this same result should
[not] be acceptable . . . when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law”).
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008) (recognizing an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms for self-defense and other lawful purposes under the Second Amendment);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding that the individual right to keep and
bear arms applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. David Kopel, Growth Chart of Right to Carry, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 17,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/17/growth-chart-ofright-to-carry/?utm_term=.f1753d60a71b [https://perma.cc/WNA4-SR6T] (describing dramatic
increase in states providing “objective and fair procedures for the issuance of concealed handgun
carry permits” between 1986 and 2014).
20. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“Perhaps
the most immediate impact of expanding gun rights on policing tactics is legal uncertainty regarding
what police can do when they observe, or learn of, a person carrying a firearm.”).
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“Before the Court’s decision in [District of Columbia v.] Heller,21 there
was a widely-held ‘assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon
was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession,’” thus
justifying a stop under the first Terry prong.22 Moreover, there was once
“nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous,”
giving officers the right to frisk armed individuals on the basis of this
“blanket assumption of dangerousness.”23 But in a post-Heller world,
where more than forty states have little or no restrictions on the public
concealed carry of firearms,24 courts can no longer assume that public
handgun possession is unlawful.25 Moreover, “holes have begun to appear
in the blanket assumption of dangerousness that courts used to apply to
firearms and their carriers.”26
This Article explores the growing tension between increasingly
permissive “right to carry” laws throughout the country and the rights of
officers to safely conduct investigative stops and searches. In doing so,
the Article makes three contributions to the existing literature and offers
a word of caution about the conclusions it reaches.
First, it corrects a misconception often repeated by courts and scholars
that Heller directly forces a reexamination of Fourth Amendment stop and
frisk doctrine.27 Heller did nothing more than recognize an individual’s
21. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
22. Matthew J. Wilkins, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2017); see also Bellin, supra note 20, at 25 (“Traditionally,
courts (and police) assumed that officers could stop and question someone they observed with a
concealed handgun, at least in jurisdictions with strict regulation of concealed weapon carrying.”).
23. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1170.
24. Concealed
Carry,
GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/
[https://perma.cc/A536-U56E] (summarizing concealed carry laws by state and noting that twelve
states require no permits to carry concealed weapons in public and thirty additional “shall issue” states
require permits but allow little or no discretion in the issuance of the permits).
25. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’ There is no
‘automatic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.”); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir.
2000) (comparing an officer’s stop of an armed individual in a concealed carry state based on a
suspicion that possession might have been illegal as to a stop of an individual because he “possessed
a wallet, a perfectly legal act”).
26. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1171.
27. See United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208 (4th Cir. 2016) (“As public possession and
display of firearms become lawful under more circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
police practices must adapt. Within the last decade, federal constitutional law has recognized new
Second Amendment protections for individual possession of firearms.”), rev’d, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc); United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring) (“After Heller and McDonald, all of us involved in law enforcement, including judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and police officers, will need to reevaluate our thinking about these
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right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes under the Second
Amendment. It said nothing about any right to, or prohibition against,
carrying concealed firearms in public, which remains the salient feature
of firearms-based weapons searches under Terry.28 Rather, officers and
judges must reconsider the nature of “reasonable suspicion” in light of
increasingly permissive state gun-possession laws authorizing public
concealed carry, a trend dating back at least thirty years.
Second, the Article defends the premise that gun possession alone is no
longer sufficient to justify a Terry stop and articulates a new “gun
possession plus” reasonable suspicion test for investigative seizures. In
this sense, the Article seeks to swing the pendulum towards gun carriers
in recognition of the sensible (and increasingly true) presumption that
those carrying firearms in public are doing so lawfully.
Third, in recognition of the inherent dangerousness of firearms and
enhanced safety risks to officers and the public of increased public
handgun presence, the Article advocates for an officer’s ability to conduct
an automatic frisk for weapons after a lawful stop and upon reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is armed. While some lower courts have implied
that armed individuals are per se dangerous for purposes of Terry’s second
prong,29 this Article suggests a shift away from the perceived and
subjective dangerousness of the individual and towards the inherent and
objective dangerousness of the firearm. This subtle analytical shift
produces several benefits, including eliminating dependence on unreliable
empirical data about the criminal propensities (or lack thereof) of
concealed carry permit holders, reducing subjective and often
unconscious invidious judgments about the dangerousness of suspects of
color and other marginalized groups, and injecting some much-needed
common sense about the risks of firearms.

Fourth Amendment issues and how private possession of firearms figures into our thinking.”); Bellin,
supra note 20, at 26 (“The post-Heller argument that a person’s possession of a firearm cannot alone
constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a stop is simply stated.”).
28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2007) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings.”); cf. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for selfdefense outside the home”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (upholding
frisk of armed individual because “the officer reasonably believed that the person stopped ‘was armed
and thus’ dangerous” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977))); United States v.
Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding protective frisk of suspect because “Officer
Ferragamo’s reasonable suspicion [was] that Orman was carrying a gun, which is all that is required
for a protective frisk under Terry”).

06 - Fields (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

12/28/2018 4:26 PM

STOP AND FRISK

1681

At the same time, the Article recognizes the potentially negative
consequences of advocating for an “automatic frisk” regime, particularly
when the very practice of “stop and frisk” has become increasingly
synonymous with racially charged police abuses.30 An officer who stops
a person of color may be more likely to suspect, implicitly or explicitly,
that the person is armed and search that individual in a situation where he
might not search a white suspect. Accordingly, the Article concludes with
a cautious acknowledgement of the risks of advocating for automatic
frisks and suggesting that law enforcement consider not just what is
legally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, but also what makes
sense as a matter of sound community policing. The logic of Terry
justifies the automatic frisk of a gun carrier for the protection of the officer
under current reasonable suspicion analysis, a fact that, if widely adopted,
could lead to a dramatic increase in the number of warrantless frisks
conducted by police officers. This prospect understandably may cause
concern for civil libertarians and communities of color, given the terrible
history of racially discriminatory stop and frisk practices over the last half
century. While not retreating from its primary conclusions, the Article
acknowledges that legitimate concern, and suggests that law enforcement
consider alternatives to traditional frisk practices in the presence of a
citizen with a firearm.
I.

DUELING AMENDMENTS: TERRY STOPS AND EXPANDING
GUN RIGHTS

A.

The Stop and Frisk Paradigm: Origins, Justifications, Evolution

For nearly 180 years, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focused
primarily on the warrant requirement and whether arrests were properly
based upon probable cause.31 That changed with Terry, which “provided
30. One need only consider the tragic case of Philando Castile, a lawfully armed African-American
man shot to death during a traffic stop after announcing he had a firearm but was only reaching for
his identification, to recognize that no objective standard can eliminate the grave risks facing men of
color during police interactions. Mr. Castile, who had previously been stopped fifty-two times for
traffic infractions, was shot seven times by Officer Jeronimo Yanez while reaching for his driver’s
license, and later died on Facebook Live while his girlfriend filmed the encounter. Mark Berman,
What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said About the Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officerwho-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fce8a35388c2
[https://perma.cc/7ZRV-KXBC]. Yanez was later acquitted of manslaughter. Id.
31. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 262 (observing that the 1967 case Camara v.
Municipal Court changed the focus of the Fourth Amendment from warrants based on probable cause
to a “general Fourth Amendment standard of ‘reasonableness’”).
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the impetus, as well as the framework, for a move by the Supreme Court
away from the proposition that ‘warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable,’ to the competing view that the appropriate test of police
conduct ‘is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable.’”32 This shift from “probable cause”
to “reasonable suspicion” was momentous. Despite the Court’s attempt to
minimize the purportedly “quite narrow” scope of the holding, Terry
ironically expanded police power far more than a decade of friendly
Warren-era decisions did for the rights of criminal defendants.33
Terry represented what would become a typical stop and frisk case—
an on-the-street observation by an officer of a suspected violent crime. A
Cleveland beat cop observed two men standing on a street corner, then
proceeding back and forth along an identical route multiple times in front
of a department store, stopping each time to look inside the store
window.34 Each completion of the route was followed by a conference
between the two on the corner.35 The two men eventually joined up with
a third individual two blocks from the store.36 Suspecting the individuals
of “casing a job, a stick-up,” the officer stopped the three men and asked
their names.37 When the men “mumbled something,” the officer spun
around suspect John W. Terry and patted down his outside clothing,
feeling a pistol in his overcoat pocket.38 After removing a revolver from
Terry’s coat pocket, he patted down the other two suspects and seized
another revolver.39
The Court found that the officer’s actions amounted to a “search and
seizure” under the Fourth Amendment—that the officer “seized” Terry

32. Id. (citations omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (holding that lawful police
encounters can exist “which do[] not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and
yet which stop[] short of an arrest based on probable cause”).
33. RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE
FORCE 55 (2014) (quoting contemporaneous national newspapers criticizing the Warren Court for
“‘wrapp[ing] its flowing robes around all prisoners so as to virtually immunize them’ from police
interrogations,” then observing that “[i]ronically, the Warren Court’s last controversial criminal
justice decision [Terry] actually expanded police authority”); Maclin, supra note 8, at 1275 (“The
irony, of course, is that the police power to ‘frisk’ suspicious persons is the product of a Supreme
Court that did more to promote the legal rights of black Americans than any other court.”).
34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6–7.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id.
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when he stopped him on the street,40 and “searched” him when he patted
down his outside clothing.41 But despite the absence of a warrant or any
exigent circumstances previously recognized by the Court as obviating the
warrant requirement, the Court upheld the propriety of the officer’s
actions, observing that the Fourth Amendment protects only against
unreasonable searches and seizures.42 The Court defined reasonableness
as an objective test from the officer’s perspective: “[W]ould the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search ‘warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was
appropriate?”43 On the facts presented, the Court found that the officer,
utilizing his years of experience apprehending thieves, had reasonable
suspicion to suspect a crime was about to take place, and thus to stop the
individuals.44 Moreover, the Court found that the particular crime
suspected by the officer—a “stick-up”—made it reasonable for the officer
to assume the individuals were armed and dangerous.45
Importantly, the Court emphasized that “[t]he sole justification of the
search . . . is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault
of the police officer.”46 This pat down of the outer clothing “by no means
authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else
in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is
essential.”47
“Terry created a two-pronged analysis, with the first prong governing
the propriety of the initial investigatory seizure and the second prong
40. Id. at 16 (“Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).
41. Id. (“[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a ‘search.’”).
42. Id. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
43. Id. at 21–22 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion. . . . If subjective ‘good faith’ alone were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (citations omitted)).
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 28 (“[T]he record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an
investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible
danger, and took limited steps to do so.”).
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id. at 16 n.12 (quoting State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966)).
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governing the propriety of any subsequent frisk.”48 These analyses are
distinct and must be undertaken separately; the satisfaction of one prong
cannot serve as justification for the second prong. Under the first prong,
an officer may stop an individual (the seizure) if she has reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.49 Under the second prong, an officer may
frisk the individual (the search) if she has reasonable suspicion that the
person “is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”50
Because these analyses are distinct, an officer may reasonably suspect a
person is committing a crime but lack the requisite suspicion that the
individual is armed and dangerous, and vice versa.51
Since Terry, the Court has applied the “reasonable suspicion” standard
to expand an officer’s ability to stop and frisk individuals in less
suspicious and dangerous contexts. The Court has held that a traffic stop
for a motor vehicle infraction counts as a “stop” despite the absence of
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.52 Moreover, any traffic
violation, no matter how minor, can serve as a legitimate basis for the
traffic stop.53 Once stopped, pat-down searches can be conducted on
drivers or passengers,54 and officers can also expand the search beyond
the person to car compartments.55 Known as frisking “the lunge area,”56
the Court explained that an officer may protect himself by searching any
areas from which the suspect could grab a weapon.57

48. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1168 (First, “to initiate an investigatory seizure, a police officer must
have a reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped ‘ha[s] engaged, or [is] about to engage, in
criminal activity.’” Second, to search the individual, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion
that “he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual”).
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
50. Bellin, supra note 20, at 30.
51. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (“[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter,
to make a forcible stop. . . . [T]he person addressed . . . certainly need not submit to a frisk for the
questioner’s protection.”); United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
an officer may not conduct a protective search to allay a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed without
first having a reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop); United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d
998, 1000–01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding protective frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because
officers had no reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal activity).
52. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2008).
53. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
54. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
55. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
56. United States v. Morris, No. 95-50158, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 45162, at *2 (5th Cir. May 2,
1996) (citing Michigan v. Long to uphold officer’s protective search of “the ‘lunge area’” of a
suspect’s car for weapons).
57. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049.
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In 2004, the Court upheld an officer’s arrest of an individual who
refused to identify himself during a Terry stop, despite serious concerns
about the infringement of Fifth Amendment privileges against selfincrimination.58 And in 2014, the Court ruled 8-1 that a Terry stop does
not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the reasonable suspicion
developed by the officer was premised on a mistake of law.59 These cases
appear to confirm fears that, far from representing a “narrow” ruling,
Terry opened a “Pandora’s box” of broad and sweeping police
investigative powers in conflict with the originally intended primacy of
probable cause and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.60
B.

Stop, Frisk, and Firearms

When the Court decided Terry in 1968, American attitudes towards the
public possession of firearms differed significantly from today. 61 During
that time, strict control and regulation of gun possession was a bipartisan
issue, with prominent members of both parties supporting the near-total
elimination of public firearm possession.62 Even the president of the
National Rifle Association testified before Congress in favor of strict
firearms regulations, stating “I have never believed in the general practice
of carrying weapons . . . . I do not believe in the general promiscuous
toting of guns. I think it should be sharply restricted and only under

58. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188–91 (2004).
59. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
60. Esther Jeanette Windmueller, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion – The Demise of Terry v. Ohio
and Individualized Suspicion, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 549, 564 (1991) (decrying the “Pandora’s
box” opened by “Terry and its companion cases” and arguing for a new standard for individualized
suspicion so that “the individual security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be retained,
sealing the lid to the Pandora’s box of privacy-encroaching monsters”).
61. See,
e.g.,
Guns,
GALLUP
NEWS,
http://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3FR2-ELPW] (providing historical public opinion data about gun regulation). In
one historical trend noted by Gallup, 60% of Americans supported the outright ban of handguns in
1959, but by October 2017 support had fallen to 28%. Id.
62. On August 8, 1967, the U.S.House of Representatives passed by a 378-23 margin the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which among other things strictly limited interstate
transfers for handguns and raised the minimum age for buying handguns to twenty-one. To Pass H.R.
5037, The Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act of 1967, as Amended, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/90-1967/h107 [https://perma.cc/XH9X-JG5X]. The Senate
passed the bill on May 23, 1968, by a 72–4 margin. To Pass H.R. 5037, After Substituting for its Text
the Language of S. 917 as Amended, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/901968/s439 [https://perma.cc/Q5DV-MCQC]. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law on June
19, 1968, nine days after Terry. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 34, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
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licenses.”63 Perhaps most famously, on March 2, 1967, when heavily
armed members of the nascent Black Panther Party, led by co-founders
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, marched at and inside the California state
capitol to protest a bill repealing a law allowing the public carrying of
loaded firearms (and thus inadvertently launching the modern gun rights
movement),64 Governor Ronald Reagan declared that he saw “no reason
why on the street today a citizen should be carrying loaded weapons.”65
The following year, four months after the Court’s ruling in Terry,
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Gun Control Act of
1968,66 which significantly restricted interstate firearms transfer and
further limited public possession of firearms.67
Within that context, one can understand why an officer reasonably may
have suspected criminal activity was afoot when she observed,
discovered, or received a tip about an individual’s possession of a firearm
in public. An officer could reasonably suspect that a public gun possessor
was committing a weapons possession offense because most states either
tightly constricted or prohibited the public carrying of firearms.68 As a
result, courts routinely upheld Terry stops based on nothing more than
suspected gun possession.69 This assumption, combined with the once
“nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous,”
provided the necessary justification to conduct an automatic frisk of
public gun possessors.70 But in the current rapidly-changing, gun-friendly
deregulatory environment, these assumptions require reconsideration.
63. Michael S. Rosenwald, The NRA Once Believed in Gun Control and Had a Leader Who Pushed
for
It,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
22,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/05/the-forgotten-nra-leader-whodespised-the-promiscuous-toting-of-guns/?utm_term=.2f93fcd1fb0a
[https://perma.cc/X2PNKHV7].
64. Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/
[https://perma.cc/YGT9-C4ER]; see also Jad Abumrad, The Guns Show, RADIOLAB PRESENTS:
MORE
PERFECT
(Oct.
11,
2017),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/gun-show
[https://perma.cc/Q6XB-XBVM].
65. Winkler, supra note 64.
66. The Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2012)).
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 83–91; Bellin, supra note 20, at 31 (describing the widely held “assumption that
a person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession”).
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 762, 769 (N.J. 1977) (finding that an anonymous
phone tip “giving a general description and location of a ‘man with a gun’” constituted reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk the suspected individual).
70. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1170–71 (describing the “blanket assumption of dangerousness”
under which most officers and courts traditionally operated with respect to gun possessors).

06 - Fields (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]
C.

12/28/2018 4:26 PM

STOP AND FRISK

1687

Rethinking “Reasonable Suspicion” in a Concealed Carry World

Needless to say, public opinion about gun rights and gun control have
changed since the standoff between Ronald Reagan and Bobby Seale in
1967. In part owing to this shift, an increasing number of states have
relaxed or eliminated restrictions on public firearm possession.71
Beginning in the 1970s, shortly after the Black Panthers first prominently
utilized the Second Amendment as an instrument of individual gun
possession rights, the National Rifle Association followed suit, electing in
1977 an executive vice president who “would transform the NRA into a
lobbying powerhouse committed to a more aggressive view of what the
Second Amendment promises to its citizens.”72 And in the last decade, the
Court has delivered significant victories to the gun rights movement,
declaring in two landmark cases that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to possess a firearm for self-defense or any other lawful
purpose,73 and that this protection applies to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.74 These two significant changes
challenge the once-reasonable assumption that a public gun carrier is a
dangerous lawbreaker.
1.

Gun-Friendly Legislation

States’ public gun possession laws broadly fall within one of four
“right-to-carry” categories:

71. Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun
Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680–88 (1995).
72. Winkler, supra note 64. Winkler also observes the following: “[This] new NRA . . . shared
some of the Panthers’ views about firearms. Both groups valued guns primarily as a means of selfdefense. Both thought people had a right to carry guns in public places . . . . They also shared a
profound mistrust of law enforcement.” Id.
73. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny,
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. L.J. 1, 6 (2009)
(observing that Heller delivered a significant victory for gun rights advocates and “imperiled [the]
case for gun control”).
74. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–60 (2010) (discussing the well-known doctrine of
“selective incorporation,” wherein only those most fundamental of constitutional rights apply to
restrict the actions of both the federal and state governments and recognizing the “fundamental”
nature of the individual right to keep and bear arms as one restricting the states).
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Unrestricted: State law allows individuals to carry concealed firearms
for lawful purposes without a permit.75 These states are sometimes
referred to by gun rights advocates as “constitutional carry” states.76
Shall Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in
public, but the granting of such licenses is nondiscretionary and subject
only to meeting determinate criteria set forth in the law.77
May Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in
public and provides the issuing entity with discretion over the issuance of
a permit.78 This discretion varies significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.79
No Issue: State law does not allow any private citizen to carry a
concealed handgun in public, with very few limited exceptions.80
As recently as 1988, forty states either prohibited the public possession
of firearms (sixteen “no issue” jurisdictions) or tightly regulated such
possession (twenty-four “may issue” jurisdictions).81 Over the next thirty

75. Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 918–27 (2015) (discussing types of concealed carry jurisdictions); Kansas:
Permitless Carry Bill To Be Heard Tomorrow on Senate Floor, NRA-ILA (Feb. 24, 2015),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150224/kansas-permitless-carry-bill-to-be-heard-tomorrow-onsenate-floor [https://perma.cc/V457-URKU] (discussing pending “constitutional carry” or
“permitless carry” legislation in Kansas).
76. CBS 13, Maine Lawmaker Submits “Constitutional Carry” Bill, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb.
26, 2015, 7:26 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2015/02/26/news/state/maine-lawmaker-submitsconstitutional-carry-bill/ [https://perma.cc/WGH7-EGE4]; see also Charles C. W. Cooke, Vermont:
Safe and Happy and Armed to the Teeth, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 24, 2014, 8:21 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/396857 [https://perma.cc/XDN3-9UAZ] (noting that
“constitutional carry” is sometimes referred to as “Vermont carry” because Vermont for decades was
the only state in the country that did not require a permit to carry a concealed firearm in public).
77. Enright, supra note 75, at 919–20 (“As the name suggests, shall-issue laws require the issuing
authority to issue a permit to an applicant who meets delineated requirements. There is little discretion
on the part of the issuing body.”); see also Walter Ricksaw, What Is the Difference Between Shall
Issue and May Issue?, CONCEALED CARRY CLASS, http://www.concealedcarryclass.net/what-is-thedifference-between-shall-issue-and-may-issue/ [https://perma.cc/B7PS-E7LZ]; Nancy Thorne, What
is the Difference Between “May Issue”, “Shall Issue”, “No Issue” and “Unrestricted” Concealed
Carry Laws?, NAT’L CARRY ACAD. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.nationalcarryacademy.com/
mayissueshallissuenoissue/ [https://perma.cc/VW2H-QSLZ].
78. See Enright, supra note 75, at 921–23.
79. See id. at 921 n.188, 922 (observing that some “may-issue laws . . . are applied more like shallissue laws” (like Alabama), but that “[o]ne of the strictest may-issue laws is found in New York”).
80. See generally id.; Ricksaw, supra note 77; Thorne, supra note 77. See also Enright, supra note
75, at 923 (“A no-issue state is one that requires, but does not issue, permits for public carry.”).
81. As of 1988, eight states were “shall-issue” jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1988)
(enacted 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a) (1988) (enacted 1959); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(2) (Supp.
1988); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3 (1988) (enacted 1985); ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 2003(1) (1988) (enacted
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1) (1988) (enacted 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7
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years, states across the country began relaxing their public concealed and
open carry laws:82
Table 1:
Number of States with Concealed Carry Laws by Year
Year
199083
199584
200085
200586
201087
201588

Unrestricted
1
1
1
2
3
7

Shall Issue
15
27
30
35
36
35

May Issue
20
14
12
9
9
8

No Issue
14
8
7
4
2
0

(1988) (enacted 1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070 (1988). Vermont was the lone unrestricted
jurisdiction. Cooke, supra note 76.
82. Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 685 (“Since 1987, states have increasingly adopted a new
breed of concealed handgun permit laws that make easier the process for many adults to get a permit
to carry a concealed handgun.”).
83. In 1990, Tennessee switched from “no issue” to “may issue.” 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 905,
§ 3 (codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351 (West 2018)); Cramer & Kopel, supra
note 71 at 705–06. That same year, six states—Oregon, Idaho, West Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia,
and Pennsylvania—became “shall issue” jurisdictions. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 686–
707 (summarizing concealed carry handgun law changes from 1987 to 1995).
84. Four states became “shall issue” jurisdictions in 1994: Alaska, Arizona, Tennessee, and
Wyoming. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 686–707. Seven states became “shall issue”
jurisdictions in 1995: North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, and Utah. See
id.
85. Three states became “shall issue” jurisdictions in 1996: Kentucky, Louisiana, and South
Carolina. 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 119, § 1 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(4)
(West 2018)); 1996 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess., No. 4, § 1 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1379.3(A)(1) (West 2018)); 1996 S.C. Acts 464 (codified as amended S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2331-215(A)–(C) (West 2018)).
86. Six states became shall issue jurisdictions between 2001 and 2005: Michigan (2001); Colorado,
Minnesota, Missouri, and New Mexico (all 2003); and Ohio (2004). 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 638
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1) (2018)); 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 372,
§ 5b (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (West 2018)); 2003 Minn. Laws
No. 842 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 624.714(2)(b) (2018)); 2003 Mo. Laws 2nd Ex. Sess.
(codified as amended at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.101(1) (2018)); 2003 N.M. Laws ch. 255, § 4 (codified
as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4(A) (2018)); 2004 Ohio Laws (codified as amended at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D) (West 2018)). Also, in 2003, Alaska became the second state
in the country to become an “unrestricted” jurisdiction. 2003 Alaska Sess, Laws ch. 62 (repealing
Alaska’s concealed carry permitting requirements, ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700).
87. Nebraska and Kansas became shall issue jurisdictions in 2006. 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 32,
§ 3 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03 (2018)); 2006 Neb. Laws § 4 (codified as
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2430(3)(b), 69-2433 (2018)). Arizona became the third
unrestricted jurisdiction in 2010. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 59, § 2 (codified as amended at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(a) (2018)).
88. Three states became shall issue jurisdictions between 2011 and 2015: Wisconsin (2011), Iowa
(2011), and Illinois (2013). 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 175.60
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Unrestricted Shall Issue
13
29

May Issue
8

No Issue
0

As reflected above, as of 2015, every state and the District of Columbia
allow the public concealed carry of firearms.90 The vast majority of these
states are now unrestricted or shall-issue jurisdictions, in which there are
little to no restrictions on an individual’s ability to lawfully carry a firearm
in public.91 These “increasingly permissive gun-possession laws erode the
assumption that public handgun possession is unlawful.”92 “[A]s public
possession and display of firearms become lawful under more
(2018)); 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 47 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 724.7(1) (2018)); Illinois
Enacts
Nation’s
Final
Concealed-Gun
Law,
USA
Today
(July 9,
2013),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/07/09/illinois-enacts-concealed-gun-law/2503083/
[https://perma.cc/LK2Y-E6T8]. Wyoming (2011), Arkansas (2013), Kansas (2015), and Maine
(2015) became unrestricted jurisdictions. 2011 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 84, § 1 (codified as amended at
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b) (2018)); 2013 Ark. Acts § 1 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-73-309 (2018)); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 231 ch. 16, § 8 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-7c03 (2018)); 2015 Me. Laws ch. 341 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, § 2003(1) (2018)).
89. Six additional states became unrestricted jurisdictions in 2016 and 2017: Idaho, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 208,
§ 1 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(3)(f)) (2018)); 2017 N.H. Laws (codified
as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (2018)); 2017 N.D. Laws ch. 428, § 2 (codified as
amended at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62.1-02-04–62.1-02-05, 62.1-04-01–62.1-04-05) (2018)); 2016
Miss. Laws (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-7(24) (2018)); 2016 Mo. Laws
(codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030 (2018)); 2016 W. Va. Acts ch. 252 (codified as
amended at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3 (2018)).
90. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (“Every state—as well as the
District of Columbia—allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.”).
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3112;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-3302(1); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3; IOWA CODE § 724.7(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 757c03; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(A)(1); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 25, § 2003(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425b(7); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(2)(b); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 45-9-101(6)(c); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.101(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321(1); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 69-2430(3)(b), 69-2433; NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6(I)(a);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4(A); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12; N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.12(A)(12); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.291; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(e)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215(A)-(C); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.02; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070; W. VA.
CODE § 61-7-4; WIS. STAT. § 175.60; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b). In addition to these forty state
statutes, Alabama and Connecticut “by statute allow considerable police discretion but, in practice,
commonly issue permits to applicants who meet the same standards as in “shall issue” states.” Drake
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see also ALA. CODE § 13A11-75; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a).
92. Bellin, supra note 20, at 25 (“Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from
that assumption must be reevaluated.”).
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circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and police practices
must adapt.”93 In particular, “when a state elects to legalize the public
carry of firearms, . . . the Fourth Amendment equation changes, and
public possession of a gun is no longer ‘suspicious’ in a way that would
authorize a Terry stop.”94 But while increasingly permissive gun laws may
require a reexamination of the first Terry stop prong, the same logic does
not necessarily apply to the “armed and dangerous” second prong of Terry
as discussed in Part III.
2.

Heller and McDonald

Further challenging these old assumptions, the Court affirmatively
recognized for the first time a constitutional right for individuals to keep
and bear arms for lawful purposes. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 95 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a Washington, D.C., law
prohibiting all citizens (except for law enforcement officers) from
possessing handguns and requiring all lawfully-owned rifles and shotguns
to be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock.”96 Prior
to Heller, the Court had never expressly opined on the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protections for the individual right to “keep and bear
Arms”97 as opposed to the right of a “well regulated Militia”98 to do so.99
Writing for a bare majority, Justice Scalia used the opportunity to
engage in an in-depth historical and textual analysis of the Second
Amendment, something that had been missing from the Court’s previous
opinions.100 Rejecting the restrictive view that the Second Amendment did

93. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
94. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting)
(“Permitting such a justification for a Terry stop . . . would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections
for lawfully armed individuals in those states.”).
95. 554 U.S. 570 (2007).
96. Id. at 574–75.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In Heller, the Supreme Court found for
the first time that this language secured an individual, and not just a collective, right to bear arms.”).
100. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–628; see also Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the
Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1286 (2009) (“Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, began with a painstaking exegesis of the [Second] Amendment’s text—an exercise that
occasionally crossed into pedantry.”). Prior to the 1960’s, the Second Amendment was rarely litigated
and broadly viewed as an archaic military amendment like the “runt” Third Amendment. See
Abumrad, supra note 64 (discussing quiet history of Second Amendment prior to 1970); Radley
Balko, How Did America’s Police Become a Military Force on the Streets?, ABA J. (July 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_americas_police_become_a_military_force_
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nothing more than grant the people the right to form a militia and for that
militia to be armed, Justice Scalia determined that the Amendment
protected an individual right in addition to a right of the people to form an
armed militia.101 The Court found that implicit in an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms was the right to self-defense with a firearm and the
right to have a working firearm in the home.102 While recognizing that
some important limitations existed on this right,103 the Court firmly held
that “a complete prohibition [on the] use [of firearms] is invalid.”104
Heller left open the question of whether the Second Amendment’s
protections are incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, given Washington, D.C.’s special status as a federal
district.105 The Court addressed that issue two years later in McDonald v.
City of Chicago,106 finding that the Second Amendment did in fact apply
to the states as well as the federal government.107 Justice Alito, writing for
the majority, explained that the individual right to keep and bear arms
should be incorporated and applied against state and local governments,
because the right was both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”
and “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition.”108 In so doing,
the Court opined that “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’
of the Second Amendment right.”109 But like Heller, the Court in
McDonald only considered the right to private possession of firearms in
one’s home and left open for another day the scope of the right to possess
firearms in public.110

on_the_streets [https://perma.cc/8KHN-AT5K] (“You might call [the Third Amendment] the [‘]runt
piglet[’] of the Bill of Rights Amendments—short, overlooked, and sometimes the butt of jokes.”).
101. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“The phrase ‘keep arms’ was not prevalent in the written documents
of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing
the right to ‘keep arms’ as an individual right unconnected with militia service.”).
102. Id. at 599 (finding that “self-defense . . . was the central component of the right itself”).
103. Id. at 626–27 (“Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”); see also id. at 627 (limiting the right
to arms that are “in common use,” leaving it open to states to regulate and ban certain types of assault
weapons and weapons commonly useful only in military service).
104. Id. at 629.
105. Id. at 620 n.23 (noting that “incorporation” is “a question not presented by this case”).
106. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
107. Id. at 776.
108. Id. at 767.
109. Id. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).
110. Id. at 786.
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While these seminal opinions clearly carry significant weight for gun
rights jurisprudence broadly, they carry far less relevance for the Fourth
Amendment stop and frisk analysis than courts and scholars have argued
post-Heller.111 In neither case did the Court opine on whether the Second
Amendment’s protections extended to the public possession of
firearms.112 By leaving open the question, the Court may have further
“opened the door for the carry laws we have today,”113 though as noted
above that door had begun opening decades before Heller. Because the
overwhelming majority of stop and frisk cases involve encounters
between police officers and individuals in public, the Court’s refusal to
extend constitutional protections to public firearm possession renders
Heller and McDonald of little use in helping officers determine whether
reasonable suspicion exists to stop a public gun carrier. In other words,
without a clear pronouncement that public gun possession is
constitutionally-protected per se, the decisions should not change the
calculus of an officer deciding whether to stop and frisk a public gun
carrier.114
What should change the calculus instead are the public carry laws in
force in the jurisdiction where the potential encounter takes place. In an
unrestricted or “constitutional carry” jurisdiction where no state limits
exist on the right to carry firearms in public, officers arguably cannot
demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminality based solely on firearm

111. See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2015) (invalidating frisk of
backpack on suspicion that it contained a gun in light of “important developments in Second
Amendment law”); Bellin, supra note 20, at 26 (admonishing courts to require more in the “reasonable
suspicion” analysis under Terry’s first prong given that mere gun possession as become an
“increasingly common activity that is not only lawful, but specifically protected by the Second
Amendment”).
112. See Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (addressing a challenge
to the State of New York’s handgun licensing scheme, and “proceed[ing] on this assumption” that the
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller “must have some application in the very different
context of the public possession of firearms” (emphasis added)); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect
a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2008) (reviewing
Heller and “finding substantial grounds in the opinion for extending the holding to public possession
and some grounds for limiting it to the home” (emphasis added)).
113. Nadia Maraachli, The Fourth Amendment Shall Prevail, Come Heller High Water, 94 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 75, 79 (2017).
114. At most, the individual could point to the general constitutional right to keep and bear arms
for lawful purposes, including for self-defense, and argue that he publicly possessed his firearm in the
exercise of that right. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down
public handgun ban because Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for selfdefense outside the home”). But whether he was doing so lawfully would depend on the public rightto-carry law of the individual state jurisdiction, not the Court’s opinions in Heller and McDonald. See
id. (recognizing state’s authority to determine what type of public carry laws to implement).
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possession.115 Likewise, in “shall-issue” and “may-issue” jurisdictions, it
would appear difficult for an officer to determine with any reasonable
particularity that a crime is or will be committed solely based on the actual
or potential presence of a firearm.116 Without any other indicia of
criminality giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that some non-weapons
possession offense was being committed, the officer likely would have to
resort to asking the individual for proof of a gun permit. But without
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, what right under the first Terry
prong would an officer have to demand such information?117
As laws authorizing public concealed carry of firearms become the
norm rather than the exception, officers and courts must reexamine
previously-held assumptions about reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry
stop and frisk based solely on suspected handgun possession. The next
section articulates a balanced approach to this brave new world, one which
requires additional indicia of criminality to initiate a stop but authorizes
automatic frisks for (and temporary disarmaments of) firearms during a
lawful stop.
II.

THE CASE AGAINST AUTOMATIC STOPS OF GUN
CARRIERS

To initiate a stop, an officer must have “reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”118 For decades,
the only “articulable fact” on which an officer needed to rely was the
possession of a firearm, based on the assumption that the possession itself
was unlawful.119 But gun possession alone no longer reasonably indicates
unlawful activity in a concealed carry world, despite the low
“reasonableness” standard articulated in Terry.120

115. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that to allow stops of all
armed persons in a permissive concealed carry jurisdiction “would effectively eliminate Fourth
Amendment protections for lawfully armed persons”).
116. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 2015) (“While opencarry laws may put police officers . . . in awkward situations from time to time, the Ohio legislature
has decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets. The Toledo Police
Department has no authority to disregard this decision—not to mention the protections of the Fourth
Amendment—by detaining every ‘gunman’ who lawfully possess a firearm.”).
117. See Bellin, supra note 20, at 38–39 (discussing constitutional problems with “gun-license
inquir[y]” statutes).
118. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
119. See State ex rel. H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 762 (N.J. 1977); Bellin, supra note 20, at 31.
120. Bellin, supra note 20, at 26 (“Courts will be hard-pressed to accept, as constituting ‘reasonable
suspicion’ of a crime, an observation of an increasingly common [and lawful activity].”).
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Therefore, reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop requires more
than the mere presence of a firearm.121 At a minimum, some other
independent indicia of criminality should be present to justify a stop under
Terry. An imperfect analogy can be drawn from Illinois v. Wardlow,122
where the Court found that neither presence in a high-crime neighborhood
nor unprovoked flight standing alone created reasonable suspicion, but the
two together did.123 The suspicious activity of being in a “high crime area”
is insufficient to conclude that a crime is being committed, as is the
suspicious activity of evading police officers.124 But in combination, what
begins as “little more than a hunch”125 becomes reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.126
Likewise, courts should impose a “gun possession plus” requirement to
justify a Terry stop. The presence of a firearm, standing alone, creates
nothing more than a hunch that an individual possesses the gun unlawfully
or otherwise is engaging in criminal activity.127 But possession plus some
other suspicious activity may very well create the necessary reasonable
suspicion under Wardlow to stop the gun carrier.128

121. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (finding unconstitutional search of individual
based solely on tip that he was carrying a firearm and declining to adopt a “firearm exception” to
Terry stops); Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 232 (Ind. 2017) (citing J.L. and finding inadequate as
reasonable suspicion a “tip provided by the taxi driver [that] made no ‘assertion of illegality,’ [but]
rather merely had a ‘tendency to identify a determinate person’ who was in possession of a handgun”).
122. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
123. Id. at 124–25.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Johnson, 482 Fed. App’x 137, 150 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that an officer
who suspected criminal activity merely because the suspect had a prior criminal record had “little
more than a hunch” of criminal activity); United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding that officer conducting a credit check could have “little more than a hunch” that a box inside
a vehicle contained contraband).
126. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25 (“[I]t was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy
narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police.”).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating Terry
stop based on suspicion of gun possession in open-carry jurisdiction because such suspicion was
nothing more than a “hunch”).
128. United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807–08 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding stop based on
suspicion of gun possession, furtive movements, flight, and presence in a high-crime area). Indeed,
arguably even more should be required given the increasing legality of possessing guns in public, and
thus the decreasing suspiciousness of that singular action. In any circumstance, unprovoked flight
from police appears suspicious, even if standing alone it is insufficient to initiate a stop. Wardlow,
528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight – wherever it occurs – is the consummate act of evasion: It is not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). Possessing a handgun
in public, at least in a constitutional carry or shall issue state, would appear less suspicious than
unprovoked flight, as it does not carry with it any automatic suggestion of criminality.
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The Need for “Gun Possession Plus”

In the age of concealed carry, mere public possession of a firearm
cannot give rise to more than a hunch that criminal activity is afoot. As a
Florida state court declared in invalidating a stop based solely on a
civilian’s admission to a police officer that a nearby person had a handgun
in his waistband, possessing a concealed weapon “is not illegal in Florida
unless the person does not have a concealed weapons permit, a fact that
an officer cannot glean by mere observation.”129
Despite this fact, courts regularly uphold Terry stops on just such
grounds.130 On almost identical facts—a Florida civilian’s admission to a
police officer that he had a gun in his waistband—the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a stop and subsequent search of four men in a parking lot.131 In
United States v. Lewis,132 two police officers approached four men in a
parking and began what all parties agreed was a consensual encounter, in
which the officers exchanged pleasantries with the men.133 The officers
then asked “whether any of the men were carrying guns,” to which two of
the men answered in the affirmative.134 “The deputies did not ask any
follow up questions, such as whether [the men] had a valid permit for the
firearms. Rather, the officers immediately drew their weapons and
ordered all four men to sit down on the ground and show their hands.”135
In invalidating the stop, the district court concluded that the officers
“lacked any particularized and objective suspicion that any of the four
men had been engaged in, or were about to engage in criminal activity at
the time the officers ordered the men to the ground.”136 In particular, “it
was neither per se unlawful to possess a handgun nor illegal to admit to
carrying one, and . . . the police had no reason to believe that [the men]
did not have a concealed-weapons permit for the firearm.”137
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that “[b]ased on McRae’s
admission that he was carrying a handgun in his waistband, the officers
129. Regalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
130. Bellin, supra note 20, at 28 (“The view that concealed handgun possession constitutes
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop finds broad support in the lower federal courts.”).
131. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012).
132. 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
133. Id. at 1300 (“Deputy Bojko asked ‘how you guys doing’ and tried to ‘start a casual
conversation.’ Deputy Stiles similarly testified that the deputies introduced themselves and said, ‘Hey,
gentlemen, how is it going.’”).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1301.
136. Id. at 1302.
137. Id.
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had reasonable suspicion to believe that McRae was committing a crime
under Florida law—carrying a concealed weapon.”138 It did not matter to
the Court that the officers could have asked during the consensual
encounter whether McRae had a concealed weapons permit; in fact, the
officers’ ignorance of this fact weighed in favor of the detention.139
While the Court emphasized that “reasonable suspicion analysis is not
concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with probabilities,’”140 it failed to
explore what “probabilities” gave rise to the officers’ reasonable
suspicion when all they observed was an activity that, on its face, is legal
in Florida.141 Presumably, the Court would not uphold an officer’s
detention of a motor vehicle driver based on nothing more than a suspicion
that the driver did not have a license to operate the vehicle. But without
more articulable facts, how does this hypothetical meaningfully differ?
Both scenarios involve facially lawful conduct—possessing a concealed
firearm and driving a motor vehicle—that requires a license. The only
difference for practical purposes is that the former scenario involves an
inherently dangerous instrument (a firearm) that poses a safety risk to the
officer; but a safety risk alone cannot justify a stop under Terry.142
However, while a bright line “gun possession plus” rule reflects a
necessary adaptation of old post-Terry precedent to new factual realities,
adopting the rule in practice may prove difficult. It can often be difficult
for courts to discern after the fact whether a stop was made solely because
of the presence of a firearm or because of additional articulable facts that
may or may not have been part of the initial calculus. Moreover, defining

138. Id. at 1304.
139. Id. at 1305 (“[T]he officers did not know that McRae lawfully possessed his firearm at the
time of the detention . . . the reasonable suspicion inquiry focuses on the information available to the
officers at the time of the stop—here, when the officers pulled their guns and ordered the four men to
the ground—not information that the officers might later discover.”).
140. Id. at 1304 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
141. Id. at 1312 n.4 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the State of Florida, pursuant to Fla. Stat.
§ 790.01(2), it is not illegal for a person to carry a concealed weapon, provided he is also in possession
of a valid state issued carrying permit, as was the case with Mr. McRae.”).
142. See United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity is “required prior to a [protective] frisk” for weapons); In re Ilono H.,
210 Ariz. 473, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]n officer’s right to conduct a patdown search should
be predicated on the officer’s right to initiate an investigatory stop in the first instance.”); Gomez v.
United States, 597 A.2d 884, 890–91 (D.C. 1991) (observing that, without reasonable suspicion,
police could not justify a frisk based on officer safety concerns alone); cf. Bellin, supra note 20 at 30–
31 (“[A] necessary implication of [Terry] is that guns can be seized, at least temporarily, under both
prongs: either as part of the stop, if the gun possession is unlawful, or as part of the frisk, if the firearm
makes the person ‘presently dangerous.’”).
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these additional facts can be difficult, particularly in comparison to the
dominant fact at issue—the presence of a firearm.143
For example, in Schubert v. City of Springfield,144 the First Circuit held
that an officer observing “a prominent criminal defense attorney” walking
towards a courthouse in a “high-crime area” with a “handgun in a holster”
had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the attorney.145 At some points
in the opinion, the court appeared to justify the stop solely on the
observation of the firearm: “[t]he officer observed Schubert walking
toward the Springfield courthouse carrying a gun. This simple, undisputed
fact provided a sufficient basis for Stern’s concern that Schubert may
have been about to commit a criminal act.”146 Elsewhere in the opinion,
however, the court appeared to rely on the presence of additional
articulable facts, including that “the officer saw a man carrying a gun in a
high-crime area, walking toward an important public building,”147 and that
in the officer’s experience, “most people who carry firearms in
Springfield are not licensed to do so.”148 Importantly, while the opinion is
unclear whether the officer suspected a mere weapons violation or
something more serious, the court clearly contemplated something
potentially more catastrophic: “A Terry stop is intended for just such a
situation, where . . . immediate action is required to ensure that any
criminal activity is stopped or prevented.”149
Conversely, in United States v. Mayo,150 the Fourth Circuit upheld the
propriety of a Terry stop based solely on the suspicion that the individual
illegally possessed a firearm.151 The court discussed in detail the variety
of factors giving rise to the officers’ suspicion, including the “high-crime
area” in which they found the suspect, the suspect’s placement of “his

143. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2009).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 499.
146. Id. at 501, 502 n.4 (“The officer’s ground for suspicion was [sufficient] . . . as the officer here
could confirm with his own eyes that Schubert indeed possessed a weapon.”).
147. Id. at 501–02.
148. Id. at 502 n.3.
149. Id. at 502 (“We need not outline in detail the obvious and potentially horrific events that could
have transpired had an officer noted a man walking toward the courthouse with a gun and chosen not
to intervene.”).
150. 361 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2004).
151. Id. at 803 (finding that the officers “had a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts
that Mayo was possessing a concealed weapon”). While the opinion does not discuss Virginia’s
concealed carry laws when this incident took place in 2003, Virginia became a mandatory, discretionless “shall issue” state in 1995. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308.01–.015, 18.2-283, 18.2-283.1, 18.2287.01 (2018).
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hand in his pocket and the appearance of something heavy in his pocket”
upon viewing the marked patrol car, his evasive action upon seeing the
vehicle, and his “unusually nervous” behavior upon being approached by
the officers.152 While one of the factors pertained solely to his suspected
firearm possession, the other three factors clearly existed independently
of the “appearance of something heavy in his pocket.”153 Indeed, it
appears the court could have upheld the stop under Wardlow without the
firearm-possession suspicion, because the suspect was seen in a highcrime area and he evaded the police.
The Mayo court’s careful articulation of indicia of criminality
independent from the suspected presence of a firearm should become the
norm for adjudicating the validity of Terry stops in the future.154 But
absent typically suspicious factors like evasion, furtive movements, flight,
or presence in a high-crime area,155 how are officers to discern which
public gun carriers are in lawful possession of their firearms and which
ones are committing felony weapons violations?
B.

What Is “Reasonable Suspicion” of a Firearms Violation?

Officers can develop reasonable suspicion that any type of criminal
activity—not just a firearms violation—is afoot based at least in part on
an individual’s suspected firearms possession. The officer in Terry

152. Mayo, 361 F.3d at 805–06.
153. Id. at 807.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding stop and
frisk based in part on suspicion of gun possession because “(1) Mr. Hunter was in a high crime area,
known for drug and firearm arrests; (2) Mr. Hunter was standing over and observing unlawful
gambling; (3) Mr. Hunter saw the police approach and then began to walk quickly away; and (4) as
Mr. Hunter turned to walk away, Officer Adams saw a bulge in his waistband.” (emphasis added)).
155. The “presence in a high-crime area” indicator is particularly troubling in the context of
concealed carry for two reasons. First, one presumably should not be punished for taking precautions
to protect herself in a high-crime area, particularly given that Heller and McDonald make clear that
the Second Amendment’s individual firearm guarantees stem from an individual’s rights to selfprotection. Second, and more fundamentally, the use of “presence in a high-crime area” as an indicator
of criminal activity at all has the practical effect of criminalizing one’s presence in her own
neighborhood. Moreover, several courts have recognized the danger in allowing “high-crime area
designations [to] be permitted to serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.” United States v. Shank, 543
F.3d 309, 322 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schirf, No. 3:15-cr-00012-RRB-KFM, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 189190, at *12 (D. Ark. Aug. 18, 2015) (“[C]ourts have been instructed to carefully scrutinize
claims that a particular area is a bad or high crime area to ensure the label is actually evidence-based,
and not just a description that easily can serve as a proxy for race, ethnic, or socioeconomic
profiling.”); see also Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty Five: A Revisionist’s View, 74 MISS. L.J.
423, 493–94 (2004) (“By sanctioning investigative stops on little more than the area in which the stop
takes place, the phrase ‘high crime area’ has the effect of criminalizing race.”).
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suspected Mr. Terry was preparing to commit an armed robbery.156 But
much of the case law discussing whether reasonable suspicion existed to
stop an individual based solely on the presence of a firearm involved an
officer’s suspicion that the suspect unlawfully possessed the weapon. For
example, in the pre-Heller case Adams v. Williams,157 the U.S. Supreme
Court suggested that possession of a concealed handgun, standing alone,
constituted at least “reasonable suspicion” for a Terry stop and frisk even
though the jurisdiction in question allowed gun possession with a
permit.158 This reasoning needs reexamination. “Absent evidence that a
person’s firearm possession is unlicensed, the first prong of Terry no
longer justifies” a stop.159 So how does an officer determine whether a
public gun carrier has the legal right to carry the firearm?
Some state and local governments have attempted to legislate around
this constitutional quandary by giving law enforcement greater authority
to investigate the lawfulness of public gun possession.160 These
governments have created a form of “gun-license inquiry” mechanism
whereby, as a condition of receiving a concealed or open carry permit,
firearms possessors agree to carry their licenses in public and willingly
present them to police officers upon request.161 This approach has intuitive
appeal, as it purports to create a voluntary, noninvasive encounter that
allows officers to determine, at a minimum, whether a firearms licensing
law has been violated.
“If the person produces a valid license, the officer’s suspicions of
a weapons-possession offense will be dispelled. If the person does
not produce a valid license, the officer now possesses at least
‘reasonable suspicion’ of a violation of the firearm licensing laws.
The officer could confiscate the firearm and arrest the suspected
offender.”162

156. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1968); see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 714
(4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, even a lawfully possessed
firearm can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness.”).
157. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
158. Id. at 148–49.
159. Bellin, supra note 20, at 31; see also Robinson, 846 F.3d at 709 n.1 (Harris, J., dissenting)
(“We have held that in jurisdictions generally allowing public gun possession, police testimony that
few law-abiding citizens take advantage of that right is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion
for a Terry stop when a gun is publicly displayed.”).
160. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 20, at 29–30 (discussing legislation in Georgia authorizing police
officers to ask for documents confirming lawfulness of gun possession).
161. Id. at 38–39.
162. Id. at 39.
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But this approach raises serious constitutional questions. While the
licensing inquiry system arguably prevents a more invasive frisk from
taking place, it assumes that the gun carrier has been lawfully stopped.
Under a traditional Terry analysis, this would require the officer to have
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed before being allowed
to initiate the inquiry.163 While courts have upheld the validity of drivers
license inquiries during a motor vehicle stop, as well as the arrest of
individuals who fail to produce a driver’s license, in those cases the
officers had a lawful reason to stop the individual—a suspected driving
infraction.164 Likewise, in states requiring individuals to identify
themselves to police officers, arrests following a failure to do so are only
upheld as long as the stop was “justified at its inception” and the request
for information “has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and
practical demands of a Terry stop.”165
Thus, under existing precedent, these gun-license inquiries can only
survive constitutional scrutiny if the officer had some independent, lawful
reason to initiate the Terry stop. “If the police cannot constitutionally
require gun carriers to produce a license, officers cannot consider a failure
to respond to a voluntary license inquiry as a basis for ‘reasonable
suspicion.’”166
It must also be considered whether a gun carrier has, by voluntarily
agreeing to produce a gun permit upon request as a condition of the
permit, effectively placed the interaction outside of Terry and into the
voluntary innocent officer inquiry framework. Even if that were so, it does
not solve the problem. A gun carrier can contract with the state to
volunteer certain information to a police officer upon inquiry, but the
police officer still will not know who has made such an agreement prior
to asking the question. While of course a police officer is free to approach
163. Id. (“The framework’s constitutionality depends on whether police can compel gun carriers to
stop what they are doing and produce a firearm license.”).
164. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (confirming
propriety of “ordinary inquiries incident to [a] traffic stop,” such as “checking the driver’s license”);
Williams v. Vasquez, 62 Fed. App’x 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding constitutionality of stop
where officer possessed probable cause to arrest for “failure to produce a valid [driver’s] license”).
165. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004); see also Bellin, supra note 20,
at 40 (“Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize police to request a license prior to the
officer’s development of ‘reasonable suspicion’ to suspect a gun carrier of any offense. The proper
analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not violated any traffic law and
asking the driver to produce a license . . . .”).
166. Bellin, supra note 20, at 40; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding
that without “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . . stopping
an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license . . . [is] unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment”).
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individuals and ask questions absent reasonable suspicion, individuals are
free to refuse to cooperate.167 But in a “gun-license inquiry” state, would
not refusal to cooperate indicate unlawful gun possession as a matter of
logic? Such a scenario seems likely in a gun-license inquiry regime, but it
would also turn Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on its head. “[A]
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”168 But in a
jurisdiction where every law-abiding gun carrier has consented to
cooperate with authorities, it would appear that an individual’s refusal to
cooperate, without more, would create reasonable suspicion of unlawful
weapons possession.169
In short, in the absence of an agreement to engage in a consensual
encounter with an officer, an individual remains free under the Fourth
Amendment not to answer any questions from the officer unless the
officer has reasonable suspicion independent of the refusal to cooperate
to stop the individual. The fact that other civilians have decided to initiate
an encounter with police ought not compel others to do the same or face
an investigatory stop.
However, officers still retain tools to develop reasonable suspicion of
a weapons violation. In the absence of other indicia of criminality or the
authority to demand proof of gun permits, officers can stop individuals
who appear from specific and articulable facts not to meet the
requirements to possess a concealed carry firearm.170 In “may issue” or
“shall issue” jurisdictions, officers can lawfully stop individuals who
appear not to meet the objective licensing requirements, such as the
minimum age requirement.171 Moreover, if officers know an armed
167. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“We have consistently held that a refusal to
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure.”).
168. Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”).
169. Concealed permit carriers are free to contract away certain Fourth Amendment rights. Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (affirming surrender of Fourth Amendment rights); Jason S.
Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or Constitutional Necessity?,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1794–95 (“The Supreme Court has affirmed the view that a person can
surrender constitutional rights by contract. Individuals may voluntarily contract away Fourth
Amendment rights.”). But their decision to do so should not strip away the robust Fourth Amendment
protections of those who chose not to do so.
170. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (noting that several
concealed carry states have minimum age requirements between eighteen and twenty-one, while
others require more discretionary showings such as “good moral character”).
171. Id.
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individual falls into one of the disqualifying classes for state permitting
requirements—if the individual is a convicted felon, a domestic violence
misdemeanant, or an undocumented immigrant, for example—the officer
not only possesses reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop but also likely
probable cause for an arrest.172 Likewise, in all jurisdictions, including
unrestricted jurisdictions, officers may develop reasonable suspicion to
lawfully stop individuals if they suspect the individuals are in violation of
federal firearms possession laws.173
III. THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC FRISKS OF GUN CARRIERS
As the previous section illustrates, where the state legislature “has
decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets,” the
police have no authority to disregard this decision by subjecting lawabiding citizens to Terry stops based on nothing more than suspicion of
gun possession.174 But once a lawful Terry stop has been initiated, what
level of reasonable suspicion is necessary to initiate a frisk? Must the
officer determine through “specific and articulable facts” that the suspect
is not only armed, but also dangerous?175 Can the officer simply rely on
the actual or suspected presence of a firearm to conclude that the
individual is “armed, and thus dangerous?”176 And should changing gun
legislation and precedent affect the frisk analysis, as it does the stop
analysis?
Officers can satisfy the second Terry prong and conduct an automatic
frisk based solely on the suspected presence of a firearm, but not for the
reason articulated by courts and scholars. Rather than concluding that a
frisk is proper because the individual poses a per se danger to the officer
and the public,177 courts instead should conclude that a frisk is proper
because the firearm poses an inherent and significant danger to the officer
and the public. While the outcome remains the same, this subtle analytical
172. See id.
173. Federal law criminalizes firearm possession by juveniles (under age eighteen), fugitives,
felons, domestic violence misdemeanants, drug users, certain persons with mental illness, and
undocumented immigrants. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (x)(2), (x)(5) (2012) (defining juveniles as those
under eighteen). An officer’s reasonable suspicion that a public gun possessor fits into one of these
categories would qualify as the “gun possession plus” necessary to initiate a stop and should also
satisfy the “armed and dangerous” frisk prong.
174. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131–33 (6th Cir. 2015).
175. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 709 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Supreme Court for decades has adhered to the conjunctive ‘armed and dangerous’ formulation, giving
no indication that ‘dangerous’ may be read out of the equation as an expendable redundancy.”).
176. Id. at 700 (observing that the Court in Terry concluded that the suspect was “armed and thus
presented a threat to the officer’s safety”).
177. Id. at 705 (“[I]ndividuals who choose to carry firearms are inherently dangerous.”).
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difference eliminates many normative value judgments about the
individual while injecting some much-needed jurisprudential clarity about
the inherent and potentially catastrophic danger posed by concealed
firearms. It also dispenses with the implied requirement that officers rely
on questionable and contradictory empirical data about the inherent
dangerousness of concealed firearms carriers. In addition, by focusing the
analysis on an objective fact—the presence of a firearm—rather than any
subjective assessment of the gun carrier, this approach could help
eliminate determinations made on the basis of invidious or implicit racial
or social bias.
While creating an objective standard for frisks of gun carriers may help
promote objective enforcement without regard to race, it would be
foolhardy to ignore the data confirming that stop and frisk practices are
both disproportionately employed against people of color178 and are not
particularly effective in creating community trust or efficiently fighting
crime.179 In recognition of these facts, while the law and logic of stop and
frisk authorize automatic frisks of gun carriers, officers and police
departments ought to consider whether employing an automatic frisk
regime makes sense as a matter of sound and just policing.
A.

Recognizing the Inherent Dangerousness of Firearms

With respect to the “armed and dangerous” second Terry prong, courts
ought to shift focus from the potential dangerousness of the individual to
the inherent dangerousness of the firearm. While the outcome of cases
employing such a shift would largely align with those adopting a per se
dangerous individual position, this shift in reasoning is important in three
respects.
First, by refocusing the discussion on the inherent dangerousness of
firearms in public places (which neither court rulings nor legislation has
changed), courts can reaffirm the primary justification of limited weapons
searches—to protect the officer and the public.180 Second, this approach
178. See Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR
(July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias
[https://perma.cc/56HD-DABK] (citing “eighteen academic studies, legal rulings, and media
investigations” highlighting the disproportionate use of stop and frisk practices and police violence
against communities of color, including studies finding that officers were more than twice as likely
to stop black and Latino drivers than white drivers and more than four times as likely to search black
and Latino suspects than white suspects, but less likely to find contraband on black and Latino
suspects than on white suspects).
179. See infra note 222.
180. See, e.g., Robinson, 846 F.3d at 700 (confirming that the original Terry frisk formulation
centered on the officer’s safety and not on any evidentiary search or normative value judgments about
the propriety of public weapons possession).
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eliminates the need for officers to make split-second reasonableness
decisions based on complex empirical data regarding the ubiquity of
concealed and open carry permits, the prevalence of lawful versus
unlawful weapons possession in a given jurisdiction, and the incidence of
violence and criminality among the concealed carry permit population.
Third, focusing on the objective fact that a weapon exists and not any
subjective assessments of the individual injects a level of much-needed
objectivity to the Terry analysis and eliminates the need to rely on ad hoc
judgments grounded in implicit (or explicit) bias.
1.

Acknowledging the Inherent Dangerousness of Firearms

Much of the discussion related to the second Terry prong in post-Heller
cases centers on whether the armed individual stopped is dangerous.
Courts have split over the issue whether an armed individual is
automatically dangerous, or if an officer must show both that the
individual is armed and also dangerous. For example, in United States v.
Robinson,181 the Fourth Circuit held that any individual who the police
suspect possesses a firearm becomes a dangerous individual per se for
Terry purposes.182 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, in more limited
discussions, similarly found that police had an automatic right to assume
that an armed individual was necessarily dangerous.183 In contrast, in
Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department,184 the Sixth Circuit held
that, “[c]learly established law require[s] [officers] to point to evidence”
that suspects are both “armed and dangerous.”185 Only in Robinson did
the court discuss the dangerousness of the firearm, but the Court’s holding
ultimately rested on the risk the individual posed to the police.186
This focus on the individual is consistent with the language of Terry
and its progeny, which asks whether the officer has “reason to believe that

181. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017).
182. Id. at 704 (“[T]he officer reasonably believed that the person stopped ‘was armed and thus’
dangerous.”); cf. id. at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that “armed” and “dangerous” are two
separate prongs of a conjunctive test).
183. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding frisk justified on
nothing more than the presence of a firearm); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.
2007) (same).
184. 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).
185. Id. at 1132.
186. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 705 (collecting cases observing the “inherently violent nature of
firearms,” but concluding that “lawfully-stopped individuals armed with firearms are categorically
dangerous” (emphasis added)).
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he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.”187 Scholars on
both sides of the argument also focus on the potential dangerousness of
the individual holding the weapon rather than the weapon itself.188
Supporters of the per se dangerousness approach focus on the precise
language of Terry “for the proposition that all armed persons are
inherently dangerous,” and that an officer must “tak[e] steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.”189
Critics of the per se dangerousness approach scoff at any suggestion that
an armed individual in a concealed carry state is automatically dangerous,
claiming that “there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors
rarely use their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as robberies
or murders.”190
While neither position inherently lacks merit, each highlights the
charged and philosophically opposed worldviews of gun ownership and
possession—one in which gun owners are among the most reckless and
dangerous members of society and one in which gun owners are among
the most responsible and peaceful.191 These group-based conclusions
about a class of individuals oversimplify the issue and obscure the
undeniable objective fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous device
created specifically and solely to inflict damage, and thus, that the

187. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
188. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33 (arguing against the automatic frisks of gun carriers,
with reference to “the relatively small danger posed by gun carriers”); Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1176
(advocating for automatic frisks and arguing that “[f]irearms—and the [p]ersons [w]ho [p]ossess
[t]hem—[a]re [i]nherently [d]angerous for Terry [p]urposes”).
189. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1176–77.
190. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32. While this may be true, to get to the second Terry prong an officer
must already have developed a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Thus, even if in
the aggregate licensed conceal gun carriers are law abiding, in the individual instance where the
“armed and dangerousness” prong becomes a factor, that presumption of law abidingness no longer
exists.
191. See, e.g., David Rothkopf, Mad Men, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 9, 2013, 11:30 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/09/mad-men/ [https://perma.cc/SX4U-H5SN] (calling then-Senate
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and other gun rights supporters more dangerous than Kim Jong
Un for supporting “America’s out-of-control gun culture”); Jeb Golinkin, The Left’s Demonization of
Gun
Owners
Has
Gotten
Out
of
Hand,
WEEK
(Apr.
11,
2013),
http://theweek.com/articles/465638/lefts-demonization-gun-owners-gotten-hand (last visited Oct. 12,
2018); Matt Vespa, Study: Law-Abiding Firearms Owners Really Don’t Commit Gun Crimes (Which
Is What We’ve Been Telling You All Along), TOWNHALL (July 31, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2016/07/31/study-lawabiding-firearm-owners-really-dontcommit-gun-crimes-which-is-what-weve-been-telling-you-n2198793
[https://perma.cc/R2LVNZDJ].
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presence of a firearm in a law enforcement encounter inherently increases
the risks to public and officer safety.
Many gun rights activists bristle at this notion, claiming that guns are
only as dangerous as the people who use them.192 The argument often
proceeds that devices should not be banned or otherwise tightly regulated
just because those devices can be misused, such as a computer in the hands
of a hacker.193 But a firearm differs in meaningful ways from a computer
or other devices with multiple primary purposes beyond inflicting
damage. In tort law, a firearm is considered an inherently dangerous
instrumentality because it creates a substantial risk of harm just by its
mere existence or use, irrespective of whether it is or can be misused. 194
A computer does not create such a substantial risk of harm, even if some
risk does exist from its use. While constitutional doctrine ought not be
determined solely by reference to private tort law principles, the analogy
further highlights the recognized danger posed by a firearm regardless of
the person in possession of it. Indeed, even when one court criticized a
Terry stop based “solely on the ground that an individual possesses a
gun,” it acknowledged “the obvious potential danger to officers and the
public by a person in possession of a concealed gun in a crowd.” 195
Perhaps most telling, law enforcement training manuals themselves
require officers to recognize the inherent dangerousness and lethal

192. See, e.g., Firearms Are NOT Inherently Dangerous!, GUNLINK BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://blog.gunlink.info/2012/01/12/firearms-are-not-inherently-dangerous/
[https://perma.cc/3YMH-R7HX] (noting “that you are 25 times more likely to be injured while riding
a bicycle than while hunting . . . . [s]o next time someone makes the claim that firearms are inherently
dangerous or that guns cause or enable crime, steer them to these facts”); DENNIS A. HENIGAN, “GUNS
DON’T KILL PEOPLE, PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE” AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT GUNS AND GUN CONTROL
1–5 (2016) (“[O]n radio or TV talk shows . . . [, o]ver and over again, I would hear, ‘Guns don’t kill
people. People kill people.’ I would hear, ‘When guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns.’”).
193. Firearms Are NOT Inherently Dangerous!, supra note 192 (“[Y]our chances of getting injured
playing soccer are 34 times that of getting injured while hunting. And football? Forget about it! You’re
over 100 times more likely to get injured playing tackle football than you are while hunting.”).
194. See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting the
affirmative duties of care imposed on “manufacturers of firearms, an inherently dangerous
instrumentality”); Smith v. Brooks, 545 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that “a higher
standard of care” applies because “a loaded firearm . . . amounted to an inherently dangerous
instrumentality”). Courts in criminal cases have long referred to firearms as “inherently dangerous
instrumentalit[ies]” for purposes of inferring intent. See, e.g., State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St. 2d 267,
270, 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1982) (finding that a jury can infer intent to kill when a firearm is used,
“[g]iven the fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is
reasonably likely to produce death . . .”); State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89371, 2008–Ohio–
1404 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) (“A jury can infer intent to kill by the defendant’s use of a
firearm, an inherently dangerous instrumentality . . . .”).
195. Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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capabilities of the firearms they carry.196 If a trained law enforcement
officer is required to recognize the inherent dangerousness of her own
firearm, then surely the law should allow her to recognize the inherent
dangerousness of a firearm in the hands of a potentially untrained civilian.
2.

Limiting Reliance on Variable Data About Licensed Gun Carriers

By allowing an officer to automatically frisk an individual upon
reasonable suspicion that the individual possesses a firearm, this approach
also absolves officers of any responsibility to take into account the
imperfect and changing empirical data about the purported peaceful and
law-abiding nature of licensed gun carriers. Such empirical data is often
relied on by gun rights activists and litigants who argue that concealed
carry permit holders deserve a presumption of law-abidingness.197 But
such data only applies in the small remaining number of restrictive “may
issue” jurisdictions and quickly becomes outdated as states relax or
strengthen licensing requirements. Moreover, the very reliability of these
studies is widely disputed by longitudinal studies linking public gun
possession to violent behavior.198 Most importantly, requiring officers to
make such real-time calculations based on data sets conflicts with Terry’s
command that courts consider the perspective of the “policeman who in
the course of an investigation ha[s] to make a quick decision as to how to
protect himself and others from possible danger,” lest the “answer to [a]
question propounded by the policeman . . . be a bullet.”199

196. See, e.g., CITY OF CINCINNATI, THE CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL,
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/procman.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6H6-K7P2] ; DIV.
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICE TRAINING COMM’N, N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, BASIC
COURSE
FIREARMS
MANUAL
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/njptc/manuals/
BasicCourseFirearmsManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK39-JN6B] (requiring all firearms trainers to
“stress [that] relevant safety shall be maintained by keeping all firearms’ muzzles pointed towards the
ground” and requiring all trainees to “describe . . . the lethal capabilities of the agency handgun(s)
and shotgun(s)”); OR. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POLICE OFFICER FIELD
TRAINING
MANUAL,
https://www.ci.medford.or.us/files/Police%20Field%20Training%20Manual%206-14-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5X7X-7AXX].
197. See, e.g., Brief for the Governors of Texas, Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 9–12, Peruta v. California, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (No. 16-894) (citing
multiple studies purporting to show that concealed carry permit holders are “more than 10 times less
likely to commit a crime in Texas as compared to the general population”).
198. See Michael C. Monuteaux et al., Firearm Ownership and Violent Crime in the U.S., 49 AM.
J. OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 207, 207–08 (2015).
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63–64 (1968) (quoting
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 446 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)) (decided on the
same day as Terry).
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Critics of the automatic frisk approach to public firearms possessors
point to “the empirical data on the relative rarity of crimes committed by
licensed gun carriers.”200 These critics contend that officers should not
automatically determine that an armed person poses a danger to them or
others because data about licensed gun carriers suggests the opposite.201
Studies suggest that licensed gun possessors commit far fewer violent
crimes than the citizenry at large, and that evidence combined with the
heightened background check requirements necessary to procure a
concealed carry permit ought to provide licensed gun carriers with an
enhanced presumption of law abidingness.202 As Professor Jeffrey Bellin
argues:
Although there is a robust debate about the effect of gun carrying
on crime, there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors
rarely use their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as
robberies or murders. Thus, even if licensed gun carriers swarm
streets in the wake of the legal changes chronicled above,
strategies to suppress murders and robberies through gun
detection may remain viable so long as police can lawfully
distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun carriers and disarm only
the latter group.203
This argument may support the claim that the presence of a gun alone
should not justify a stop (because licensed gun possessors are less likely
than average to commit a violent crime). But it misses the mark with
respect to whether the presence of a gun should justify a frisk. First, the
purpose of a frisk is to protect the officer and the nearby public, not to
ferret out a potential violent crime plot.204 Searches based on less than

200. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33 (“Statistics published by the State of Texas reflect that people
with concealed handgun licenses (CHL) commit only a small fraction of the street crime associated
with public weapons possession. For example, of the roughly 4,000 people convicted for robbery or
aggravated robbery in Texas in 2011, only two possessed a CHL. The same 2011 Texas data shows
that CHL carriers included four (of over 500) convicted murderers, three (of 112) people convicted
of manslaughter, and three (of 2,765) people convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.”).
201. Id.
202. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The available data about permit
holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low
arrest rates observed to date for permit holders.”); Reconciling Stop and Frisk with Concealed Carry
Laws,
DUQ
CRIM
(Apr.
2,
2014,
12:57
PM),
http://www.duqlawblogs.org/duqcrim/2014/04/reconciling-stop-and-frisk-with-conceal-carry-laws/
[https://perma.cc/Y7TM-Y5AJ] (“As a conceal-carry permit holder . . . this signals to the officer that
the individual passed a background check within the last 5 years which should afford the individual
some presumption of law abidingness.”).
203. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33.
204. Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a frisk “is justified in order to
protect the officer during an encounter”).
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probable cause—such as Terry stops based on reasonable suspicion—
cannot be evidentiary in nature but are allowed only to the extent
necessary to protect the officer and public. The officer already made that
determination when she concluded there was reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity sufficient to initiate the stop. The presence of a firearm
alone should justify the frisk, regardless of the presumptive law
abidingness of a licensed gun carrier. Indeed, this presumption of law
abidingness necessarily diminishes upon the officer’s development of
reasonable suspicion that the armed individual is engaged in criminal
activity.
Second, empirical data about the incidence of crime for concealed carry
permit holders has no relevance in unrestricted or “constitutional carry”
jurisdictions where no permit is required. Indeed, to the extent the
empirical data about the law abidingness of permit holders depends on the
heightened background check requirements necessary to receive the
permit, such findings could arguably weigh in favor of more expansive
searches in unrestricted jurisdictions.205 If officers must give a
presumption of peaceful law abidingness to permit holders in restrictive
“may issue” states, no such presumption need be given in unrestricted
states where anyone can carry a gun in public, subject to certain federal
restrictions.206
Third, the ongoing reliability of empirical data about licensed gun
carriers depends on the static nature of the requirements for obtaining a
gun license. In other words, an empirical study observing the violent
tendencies of licensed concealed carry permit holders in Illinois would
necessarily rely on a pool of licensed individuals who met the particular
background check and other permit requirements in Illinois. Presumably,
the more restrictive the requirements, the more law-abiding the pool of
permit holders. By the same logic, as soon as Illinois changes its
permitting requirements, the empirical data set becomes obsolete, at least
to the Chicago beat cop charged with assessing dangerousness. As
205. Moore, 702 F.3d 933. Indeed, “[a] few studies find that states that allow concealed carriage of
guns outside the home and impose minimal restrictions on obtaining a gun permit have experienced
increases in assault rates.” See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again:
The Latest Evidence From 1977-2006, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 218, 224 (2009).
206. Legislation introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2017, if passed,
would further complicate the analysis for officers. The Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act would allow
holders of a concealed carry permit in one state to carry loaded concealed firearms in all fifty states.
It would allow people with permits “from states with weak permitting rules to carry into states with
strict rules, like New York and California.” Melissa Jeltsen, The GOP’s Latest Gun Bill Would Be
Catastrophic for Women Fleeing Abuse, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:47 AM)
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/concealed-carry-gun-bill-domestic-violence_us_5a26d1
cce4b06d807b4f8a63 [https://perma.cc/34BH-Q5UX].
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discussed above, states routinely change their permitting rules, and in the
last three decades those changes have uniformly come in the form of
relaxing permitting requirements.207 Thus, reliance on potentially
outdated data about a more rigorously vetted pool of concealed carry
permit holders would not only would be improper, but also dangerous.
Fourth, significant studies directly contradict the data concerning the
purported law abidingness of gun owners. One study, co-authored by
Stanford Law professor John Donohue, found that “[l]aws in all 50 states
permitting people to carry concealed firearms in public have been
connected to a rise in violent crimes,” including “‘substantially higher
rates’ of aggravated assault, rape, and robbery.”208 The study also found
that from 1999 to 2010, firearm-related murder rates rose in eight states
that adopted right-to-carry laws.209 Another study, more broadly
considering the correlation between private legal gun ownership and
violent tendencies (with or without a permit), concluded that firearms in
the United States are “disproportionately owned by people who are prone
to angry, impulsive behavior and have a potentially dangerous habit of
keeping their guns close at hand.”210
Advocates on both sides of the gun control debate have much
ammunition in the form of conflicting studies to justify their preexisting
positions. The Seventh Circuit nobly attempted to wade through the
conflicting empirical data in Moore v. Madigan,211 in which it cited
conflicting contemporary studies finding alternatively that an increase in

207. See supra section II.C.1.
208. See Shadee Ashtari, Right-To-Carry Gun Laws Linked to Rise in Violent Crimes: Study,
HUFFPOST (Nov. 14, 2014, 5:48 PM) (citing Ayres & Donohue, supra note 205, at 225),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/14/right-to-carry-laws-crime_n_6160414.html
[https://perma.cc/7D4W-V2GE].
209. Id.; see also Clifton B. Parker, Right-to-Carry Gun Laws Linked to Increase in Violent Crime,
Stanford
Research
Shows,
STANFORD
REP.
(Nov.
14,
2014),
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/november/donohue-guns-study-111414.html
[https://perma.cc/262J-5L9S] (“Now, Donohue and his colleagues have shown that extending the data
yet another decade (1999-2010) provides the most convincing evidence to date that right-to-carry
laws are associated with an increase in violent crime.”).
210. Douglas Perry, Gun Ownership and Uncontrollable Anger Go Hand in Hand, New Study
Concludes,
OREGONIAN
(Apr.
9,
2015,
7:18
PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2015/04/gun_ownership_and_uncontrollab.html
[https://perma.cc/CDR8-8A5T]; see also Melissa Healy, Nearly 9% of Americans are Angry,
Impulsive — and Have a Gun, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 5:50 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-angry-impulsive-gun-access-20150408story.html?lang=en&utm_campaign=SendToFriend&uid=0&utm_content=article&utm_source=em
ail&part=sendtofriend&utm_medium=article&position=0&china_variant=False
[https://perma.cc/M2AQ-Q32E] (citing study concluding that “people owning six or more guns were
more likely to fall into both of these categories than people who owned a single gun”).
211. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
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gun ownership correlated with an increase in homicide rates, an increase
in concealed carry permits correlated with an increase in assault rates but
not homicide rates, and an increase in concealed carry permits correlated
with a decrease in both homicide and assault rates.
Based on findings from national law assessments, cross-national
comparisons, and index studies, evidence is insufficient to
determine whether the degree or intensity of firearms regulation
is associated with decreased (or increased) violence. . . .
Some studies have found that an increase in
gun ownership causes an increase in homicide rates. . . .
A few studies find that states that allow concealed carriage of
guns outside the home and impose minimal restrictions on
obtaining a gun permit have experienced increases in assault
rates, though not in homicide rates. But it has not been shown that
those increases persist. Of another, similar paper . . . it has been
said that if they “had extended their analysis by one more year,
they would have concluded that these laws [laws allowing
concealed handguns to be carried in public] reduce crime.” . . .
[B]ut they admit that data and modeling problems prevent a
strong claim that they increase crime. 212
Putting aside the dueling data sets, the larger point for stop and frisk
purposes is that officers should not be required to wade through these
conflicting studies to come to a conclusion about the reasonable likelihood
that an armed person might be dangerous.213 Nor should they be subjected
to a post hoc argument by a litigant challenging the protective frisk with
reference to such data. Placing the frisk analysis on the presence of the
inherently dangerous firearm eliminates these unfair and unworkable
scenarios.
3.

Reducing Reliance on Implicit (and Explicit) Bias

One of the most consistent and vociferous criticisms of Terry and the
implications of its “reasonable suspicion” standard has been its potential
for abuse by racist cops seeking to harass people of color on pretextual

212. Id. at 937–39.
213. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (“In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s
conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement
officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”).
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grounds.214 For example, an officer can use something as minor as an
apparent crack in a vehicle windshield as justification to stop a person of
color on the ground that it constitutes reasonable suspicion the driver is
violating a statute prohibiting driving “in an unsafe condition as to
endanger any person.”215 The officer might then develop manufactured
reasonable suspicion of dangerousness to justify a search for weapons
based on preconceived notions about African Americans, Hispanics, or
other minority groups.216
This scenario is far from theoretical. In Maryland, from 1995 to 1997,
a survey indicated that “70% of drivers stopped on Interstate 95 were
African Americans,” although 17.5% of the drivers on the road were
black.217 Videotapes in one Florida county demonstrated that 5% of the
drivers appeared to be dark-skinned, but 70% of the drivers stopped were
African American or Hispanic, and more than 80% of the cars searched
on the highway belonged to persons of color.218 Moreover, traffic tickets
were given in less than 1% of these stops.219 This appalling disparity does
not result only from individual racist cops; explicit racial profiling tactics
implemented by police forces across the country encourage aggressively
focusing on people of color.220
214. Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review
Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 569–70 (1997) (summarizing empirical data
demonstrating disproportionate impact of Terry stops on minority groups and lamenting that Terry
allows the use of “pretext stops, [letting] police avoid having to defend their use of race altogether”);
Maclin, supra note 8, at 1287 (criticizing Terry as reflecting the Warren Court’s reluctance to “fight
to ensure that blacks, the poor, and other ‘undesirables,’ would enjoy the same constitutional
privileges possessed by the elite of American society”).
215. Muse v. State, 807 A.2d 113, 119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
216. See, e.g., Judith Zaccaria, Police Video Draws Critics, COWLEY COURIER TRAVELER (May
17,
2018),
http://www.ctnewsonline.com/news/article_fdf3b7d6-5969-11e8-a0b4ef2e98922bb3.html [https://perma.cc/FC6B-MY5D] (describing police officer’s decision to stop an
African American man because “he had not turned on his signal 100 feet before a turn,” and
proceeding to justify a search of his car because he saw “some kind of vegetation in the window
well”); Yesha Callahan, #DrivingWhileBlackWithLeavesOnTheWindshield: Kansas Man Detained
for Having ‘Vegetation’ on Window, ROOT (May 20, 2018, 8:44 AM),
https://www.theroot.com/drivingwhileblackwithleavesonthewindshield-kansas-man-1826176285
[https://perma.cc/3M78-XBQG] (describing same incident and showing video recorded by suspect
confirming that officer demanded suspect exit his vehicle purportedly because tree debris was stuck
under his windshield wiper).
217. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 36 (1999).
218. Id. at 36–37.
219. Id.
220. Joseph Goldstein, Bronx Inspector Secretly Recorded, Suggests Race Is a Factor in a Police
Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at A1–A21 (summarizing recording where commanding officer
told his officers to frisk “the right people at the right time,” and later clarifying, “I have no problem
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Explicit bias against communities of color is not the only cause of this
disparate treatment. The groundbreaking science of implicit bias—the
study of the “attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding,
actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner”221—has shed an
uncomfortable light on the widespread implicit biases held by law
enforcement personnel towards African American men and other people
of color.222 While these implicit associations “do not necessarily align
with [the] declared beliefs”223 of police officers, these “pervasive”224
biases have been linked to disproportionate stops, searches, arrests, and
killings of people of color by police officers.225 One study analyzing data
from the police department in Oakland, California, found that “while
black residents make up 28 percent of the Oakland population, they
accounted for 60 percent of police stops . . . . [and] black men were four
times more likely than white men to be searched during a traffic stop, even
though officers were no more likely to recover contraband when searching
black suspects.”226
So what can automatic frisks for weapons do to reduce racial bias? In
one respect, nothing. Authorizing automatic searches of individuals
suspected of carrying firearms will do nothing to reduce this disturbing
trend. An officer who stops a person of color may be more likely to
suspect implicitly or explicitly that the person is armed and search that
individual in a situation where he might not search a white suspect.227 But
in situations where the officer knows the individual is carrying a firearm—
either through visual observation or the suspect’s own admission—an
automatic protective frisk rule eliminates the possibility for implicit bias
to affect the officer’s assessment of the “dangerousness” of the individual.
telling you this, male blacks 14, to 20, 21”); see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 540,
577 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding NYPD stop and frisk practices unconstitutional because they
disproportionately targeted African-American and Hispanic men).
221. Understanding Implicit Bias, OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY,
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/
[https://perma.cc/YQK7-A8LC].
222. Kirsten Weir, Policing in Black & White, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (Dec. 2016),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2016/12/cover-policing.aspx [https://perma.cc/82ZG-DFXK].
223. OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 221.
224. Id.
225. Weir, supra note 222.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1012 (2007) (discussing implicit
bias research suggesting unconscious racial bias harbored by law enforcement against African
American men as reflected by officers’ faster response rates in shooting unarmed black men than
unarmed white men).
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In other words, if the analysis of whether to frisk turns on the objective
presence of a firearm and not the subjective dangerousness of the
individual, then any concern that the officer frisked the individual because
he implicitly believes “black men are more dangerous” dissipates.228 This
enhanced level of objectivity in the frisk analysis can thus promote the
reduction of at least some of the subjective and pervasive biases implicitly
projected towards groups of color.229
B.

Acknowledging the Consequences of an Automatic Frisk Regime

But even if making frisks of gun carriers automatic may promote
objectivity, civil rights activists may nonetheless scoff at the notion that
lowering the burden for lawful frisks will benefit communities of color.
This concern is valid and requires careful consideration. As noted above,
these communities historically have been subjected to discriminatory
over-policing, including racially charged stop and frisk practices.230 By
advocating for a system wherein frisks become per se permissible in the
presence of a firearm, this Article opens the door to more frisks—and
more intrusive frisks—particularly in this lawful concealed carry age. The
logical question then becomes whether expanding an often-misused law
enforcement tool simply invites more abuses.
More broadly, valid concerns have been raised about the efficacy of
widespread stop and frisk practices, period.231 The most infamous stop
228. See Jenee Desmond-Harris, How Racist Stereotypes Make Police Bias Almost Impossible to
Fight, VOX (May 5, 2015, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/5/5/8547473/police-racial-biasresearch [https://perma.cc/N6HU-NSYR] (interviewing Joshua Correll about his research on implicit
bias, who summarized it thusly: “We think this represents an awareness of a cultural stereotype—not
that our participants believe necessarily that black men are more dangerous than white men, but by
virtue of movies they watch, music they listen to, etc., they’re getting the idea that black male goes
with violent. The group and the idea are linked together in their minds whether they agree with that
stereotype or not”).
229. This position finds strong critics, who believe lower frisk standards for weapons will
exacerbate racial profiling and discrimination. See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th
Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (warning that once a state legalizes the public possession of
firearms, unchecked police discretion to single out anyone carrying a gun gives rise to “the potential
for intentional or unintentional discrimination based on neighborhood, class, race, or ethnicity”);
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (harshly criticizing other purportedly
“objective” factors such as “presence in a high crime area at night,” which, if “sufficient justification
for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth
Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or class of people”).
230. See supra section IV.A.3.
231. Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of
New York City’s “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1550 (2014) (contending that stop and frisk
in New York “was an inherently unconstitutional approach to crime fighting that probably ‘worked’
precisely because of the very aspects that render it unconstitutional”); cf. Scott Pilutik, Frisk
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and frisk practices existed in New York City during the early 2000s, when
NYPD officers consciously and dramatically increased their use of onthe-street stops and frisks to crack down on petty crimes.232 From 2004 to
2012, over 4.4 million people were stopped and frisked, including over
685,000 in 2011 alone.233 Several studies have concluded that the type of
quasi-dragnet style practices employed by the NYPD and other large
departments have resulted in a significant misallocation of precious
resources focused on harassing innocent people and nonviolent
misdemeanants at the expense of apprehending serious criminals.234 In
addition, these invasive practices may exacerbate distrust and antagonism
between police and communities police depend on in gathering evidence
and fighting crime.235
Assessment, SLATE (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:49 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/08/newyorks-stop-and-frisk-policy-is-neither-effective-nor-constitutional.html
[https://perma.cc/R3Q3U772] (arguing that stop and frisk in New York was ineffective because contraband was rarely found
during stops); Emily Badger, 12 Years of Data from New York City Suggest Stop-and-Frisk Wasn’t
That
Effective,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
21,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/21/12-years-of-data-from-new-york-citysuggest-stop-and-frisk-wasnt-that-effective/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.66b4b4886a69
[https://perma.cc/KRZ2-F6EQ]; David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk
Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 866 (2013) ( “The fact that
almost ninety percent of stops and frisks [by the NYPD] produced nothing showed just how
ineffective the tactic was.”); Dennis C. Smith, Stop and Frisk Has Lowered Crime in Other Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 2:03 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/17/doesstop-and-frisk-reduce-crime/stop-and-frisk-has-lowered-crime-in-other-cities
[https://perma.cc/79YE-MMXG] (“Research has converged on the conclusion that a shift from
reactive to proactive policing [such as stop and frisk] by the N.Y.P.D. has played the crucial role in
what the criminologist Franklin Zimring called a ‘Guinness Book of World Records crime drop.’”).
232. Editorial, Stop and Frisk Works, NAT’L REV. (July 2, 2013, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2013/07/stop-and-frisk-works-editors/
[https://perma.cc/8G53KR74] (defending NYPD’s stop and frisk practices).
233. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
234. Ivladimirova, Stop-and-Frisk: Out of 1,324 Local Searches at Sheepshead-Nostrand Houses,
Zero Guns Are Found, BKLYNER (July 24, 2012), https://bklyner.com/stop-and-frisk-sheepsheadnostrand-houses-sheepshead-bay/ [https://perma.cc/QYB7-77BT] (suggesting that police officers’
saturation of low-income housing projects without finding any guns amounts to “a major waste of
public resources”); cf. id. (“Supporters of the stop-and-frisk procedures say that the police concentrate
their hubs of activity where violent crimes are most often reported . . . because police saturate certain
areas, this becomes a deterrent for carrying a firearm.”).
235. See Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 732 (2016) (“There is a large cost to current policing methods. Current
policing creates distrust of law enforcement among the individuals targeted and in the community at
large. Although stop-and-frisk is supposed to be a method of reducing crime, ironically, the distrust
generated by stop-and-frisk makes it harder for police to solve or prevent crimes. Police aggression
risks undermining a young person’s trust in all government institutions . . . the evidence is conclusive
that stop-and-frisk, as practiced in cities such as St. Louis, Chicago, and New York, leads to a
breakdown in trust by both the person subjected to one or more unwanted encounters, and by those
who witness them.”).
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This Article offers two observations in response to these legitimate
concerns. First, many of the ills connected to stop and frisk misuse stem
from the exceedingly low reasonable suspicion standard first articulated
in Terry and lowered further in the last half century. Prior to Terry, the
Fourth Amendment generally required that absent exigent circumstances,
police were required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to
conduct a search; this provided both a heightened evidentiary showing
and a judicial check to ensure the showing had been made.236 By making
warrantless searches not only generally permissible but permissible based
on a much lower standard,237 the Warren Court virtually assured that
policing would become more invasive, more discretionary, and less
subject to judicial checks. With far greater latitude to seize and conduct
limited searches of individuals, officers have been afforded far more
opportunities to overreach, abuse stop and frisk, and unfairly
discriminate—consciously, unconsciously, in good faith, and in bad faith.
Combined with the Court’s numerous exceptions to the exclusionary
rule238 and ever-expanding qualified immunity doctrine,239 these abuses
often go completely unchecked, even after the fact.
Many have made convincing and passionate arguments that Terry was
wrongly decided,240 that the concept of “reasonable suspicion” contradicts
236. See Dressler & Thomas, supra note 2.
237. Terry v. Ohio, 362 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
238. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (Kane, J., concurring)
(“The questionable deterrent effect and the increasing number of exceptions to it transform the
exclusionary rule into a doctrine without substance.”); K. Dawn Milam, The Shifting Sands of
Deterrence Theory and the Sixth Circuit’s Trouble with Suppression in United States v. Fofana, 92
N.C. L. REV. 1426, 1439 (2014) (observing that “the Court’s increasing propensity to apply a
proportionality test[] has resulted in a proliferation of exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Fofana
illustrates the uncertainty that results from an analysis that heavily favors exceptions, which in turn
decreases deterrence”); Pamela F. Mucklow, The Admissibility of Evidence of the Pre-Trial Exercise
of Constitutional Rights, 37 COLO. LAW. 81, 84 (2008) (“There are a number of exceptions, and the
number seems to be increasing as the U.S. Supreme Court becomes increasingly skeptical of the
exclusionary rule.”).
239. See Valdez v. Roybal, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1272 (D. N.M. 2016) (“[W]hile the Supreme
Court may be expanding the qualified-immunity analysis in the Fourth Amendment context, it has
not limited the doctrine in other areas. If anything, the Court’s survey of the Supreme Court’s qualified
immunity precedent demonstrates the Supreme Court’s general expansion of qualified immunity in
all areas.”); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 64 (2016) (“[T]he Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly broadening the defense,
describing it in increasingly generous terms and inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that then
take on a life of their own.”).
240. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1286 (1998) (articulating view that “Terry was wrongly
decided,” in part because “the Fourth Amendment required probable cause of criminal conduct before
officers could search the inside of a car,” and “clear thinking recognizes that the respect and privacy
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the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment,241 and that a return to
probable cause and the warrant requirement is necessary to reclaim the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.242 While these arguments are
compelling, this Article situates itself within the reality of contemporary
Court precedent and works within that framework. Many have forcefully
and compellingly argued that stop and frisk itself represents an
unconstitutional watering down of the Fourth Amendment’s primary
purpose of requiring warrants based on probable cause. This position,
while valid, fails to account for the jurisprudential world in which we live.
By declining to recommend upending fifty years of post-Terry case law,
this Article ponders not whether stop and frisk should exist at all, but how
the reality of stop and frisk can and should adapt to our new concealed
carry world.
Second, one would be wise to remember that something may be legally
permissible without necessarily being wise as a practice or policy. Under
the current two-pronged test for reasonable suspicion, courts should
recognize an officer’s ability to lawfully frisk any armed individual who
was lawfully stopped under reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. But
while an officer may exercise this ability, she need not do so. Indeed,
given the invasiveness of thorough officer pat-downs,243 the indignity

associated with our bodies at least matches the privacy accorded automobiles”); Addressing Declining
Rights in an Era of Declining Crime, 9 J.L. & POL’Y. 215, 230 (2001) (remarks of Professor Maclin)
(“I think Terry was wrongly decided from the start in 1968, even when probable cause had more teeth
to it. The problem with Terry is not that there was reasonable suspicion there, but that a police
suspicion standard was used.”).
241. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016)
(arguing that the original meaning and intent of the Fourth Amendment equated “reasonableness”
with a warrant).
242. See Ross, supra note 235, at 732–33 (“It has been almost fifty years since Terry v. Ohio created
the stop-and-frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard, and it did so based
on a cost-benefit analysis . . . . There is now data available for a Court to test its assumptions about
the benefits and harms of stop-and-frisk . . . . Although Terry v. Ohio was decided almost fifty years
ago, the doctrine is ripe for review.”).
243. The invasiveness and emotional toll of a frisk in particular should garner careful scrutiny as
police departments consider whether to implement large scale stop and frisk practices, as it is this
intrusion that helps create lasting distrust between police and citizens. As Justice Scalia noted in a
concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381–82 (1993):
I frankly doubt . . . whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would
have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to
such indignity—which is described as follows in a police manual: Check the subject’s neck and
collar. A check should be made under the subject’s arm. Next a check should be made of the
upper back. The lower back should also be checked. . . . A check should be made of the upper
part of the man’s chest and the lower region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment
spot, should be checked. The inside thigh and crotch area also should be searched. The legs
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often experienced by those subjected to frisks, and the attendant
antagonism and distrust that frisking engenders within communities,244
police departments should consider whether adopting an automatic frisk
regime when weapons are present makes sound policy.245
Many have proposed alternatives to traditionally invasive stop and frisk
policing as a way of building trust within communities while still keeping
the peace and investigating crime, such as community policing,246 focused
deterrence,247 and infrastructure improvements.248 These alternatives
should be explored further. While frisking an armed individual is justified
by the Court’s current reasonable suspicion analysis, and in some
circumstances certainly remains the safest and soundest approach, this
Article by no means suggests that automatic frisks always reflect the best
option.

should be checked for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the shoes and cuffs of
the subject. J. Moynahan, Police Searching Procedures 7 (1963) (citations omitted).
Id. (Scalia, J. Concurring).
244. See Ross, supra note 235 at 722–23; Maclin, supra note 8.
245. Ross, supra note 235 at 732; see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Why Stop-and-Frisk Could Be Bad
for Americans’ Health, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:24 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/whystop-and-frisk-could-be-bad-for-americans-health-ca403b384520/ [https://perma.cc/YB4T-TNDT]
(summarizing studies finding that individuals “who frequently have intrusive encounters with the
police report increased levels of anxiety and trauma”); Joshua Rhett Miller, Man Sues Cop for Anal
Probe on Sidewalk, N.Y. POST (July 19, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/07/19/man-suescop-for-anal-probe-on-sidewalk/ [https://perma.cc/DH2F-5MW9] (“A man in Washington, DC, is
suing a police officer for probing his anus and grabbing his genitals in an invasive body search during
a stop-and-frisk last year.”).
246. Graham Kates, Examining Alternatives to “Stop-and-Frisk”, CRIME REPORT (Nov. 15, 2013),
https://thecrimereport.org/2013/11/15/2013-11-examining-alternatives-to-stop-and-frisk/#
[https://perma.cc/6D5E-FGNT] (describing “a series of unorthodox initiatives” taken by the Orlando
Police Department to combat crime in one complex, including “sponsor[ing] GED classes, counseling
for emotionally-scarred kids too used to the sounds of gunfire; [and] police help[ing] residents ‘spruce
up’ the buildings with new shrubbery and paint. Crime at the complex dropped 32 percent”).
247. James Forman, Jr. & Trevor Stutz, Beyond Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A23
(“[F]ocused deterrence is in many ways the opposite of stopping and frisking large sections of the
population. Beginning with the recognition that a small cohort of young men are responsible for most
of the violent crime in minority neighborhoods, it targets the worst culprits for intensive investigation
and criminal prosecution. Focused deterrence also builds up community trust in the police, who are
now going after the real bad guys instead of harassing innocent bystanders in an effort to score easy
arrests.”).
248. Conor Friedersdorf, How to Stop Violent Crime Without Stop and Frisk, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23,
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/how-to-stop-violent-crime-withoutstop-and-frisk/278975/ [https://perma.cc/824U-94CH] (“Infrastructure improvements as varied as
better-lit streets and air-conditioned community centers open late in dangerous neighborhoods during
the summer seem like they’re worth trying.”).
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To Disarm or Not Disarm?

A final question requires consideration: even an automatic frisk for
firearms during a Terry stop is justifiable, should the officer be allowed to
physically disarm the individual? “Weapons seizures are not an explicit
part of the Terry framework, but a necessary implication of the case is that
guns can be seized, at least temporarily, . . . if the firearm makes the
person ‘presently dangerous.’”249 Although the past assumption “that a
person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful
weapons possession” no longer suffices to disarm an individual “with
little analysis,” a recognition of the inherent dangerousness of guns should
allow for an automatic temporary disarming of the individual during a
lawful stop.250 Indeed, “[c]ourts may agree that the inherent dangers of
firearms makes this showing essentially automatic whenever officers
encounter armed persons in public.”251
Critics of this approach point to Terry’s requirement that there be
“specific, articulable” facts to justify a stop and that pointing merely to
the presence of a firearm is insufficiently specific or articulable.252 But
why? A single objective indicator of criminality (such as the possession
of heroin) is more than sufficiently specific and articulable to justify a stop
because a stop is warranted when there is suspicion of criminal activity. It
follows then that a single objective indicator of dangerousness (such as a
concealed firearm) ought to be sufficiently specific and articulable to
justify a frisk. In other words, if the analysis turns on the objective
presence of a firearm and the recognition of its inherent danger, as it
should, then these facts alone should be specific enough to justify both a
weapons frisk and a temporary disarmament if firearms are found.253
This does not mean the “specific and articulable facts” threshold
becomes obsolete in the second prong Terry analysis. Rather, courts will
focus on the specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable

249. Bellin, supra note 20, at 30–31 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir.
2004)).
250. Id. at 31.
251. Id. at 31; see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 705 (4th Cir. 2014).
252. See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 713–14 (Harris, J., dissenting) (“Absent some ‘specific,
articulable suspicion of danger’ in a particular case . . . West Virginia’s citizens, including its police
officers, must trust their state’s considered judgment that the benefits of its approach to public gun
possession outweigh the risks.” (quoting United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168–69 (4th Cir.
1998))).
253. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 2013) (“No officer reasonably
suspecting criminal activity . . . ’should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer
might be a bullet.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
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suspicion that the individual possessed a firearm, not on whether the
armed individual was dangerous.254 This shift from whether certain
indicators suggested that the armed person is dangerous to whether certain
indicators suggested that the person was armed may help eliminate the
subjectivity of Terry stops and frisks so frequently cited as a reason to rein
in the doctrine or overrule Terry altogether. While subjective assessments
and conscious or unconscious biases of police officers can never be
eliminated entirely, requiring officers to articulate facts as to why they
believed a suspect was armed rather than why a suspect was dangerous at
least moves the analysis away from the potentially troublesome
assessments of the person and towards the objective presence of the
firearm.255
Indeed, even those who criticize this blanket approach admit that,
absent some enhanced law enforcement authority to frisk and disarm,
“officers will be forced to interact with armed citizens on equal
terms . . . . That fact itself may discourage investigations of armed
individuals . . . . The most common reaction of officers in the new gunfriendly era to tips, observations, or discoveries of concealed weapons
may be to steer clear.”256 In an increasingly concealed carry world, civil
society needs the opposite reaction from its peace officers. We need
increased engagement from police officers to ensure the safety of all
citizens—both armed and unarmed—where, in this concealed carry
world, public streets, restaurants, banks, bars, parades, and protests are
flooded with lethal and inherently dangerous weapons.
CONCLUSION
The number of private firearms in this country now exceed the number
of people physically present in the country.257 All fifty states and the
District of Columbia authorize public concealed carry of these firearms

254. Id. at 488 (“Officer Munoz saw the handgun because Defendant was bending over stocking
shelves . . . providing the officer all the suspicion he needed . . .”); United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d
802, 803 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Officer Cornett observed that Mayo ‘either . . . had something heavy in
[his] pocket or he was pushing his hand down’ into the pocket, a movement that Officer Cornett
believed was consistent with an individual’s effort to maintain control of a weapon while moving.”).
255. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 220.
256. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32.
257. Christopher Ingraham, There Are Now More Guns Than People in the United States, WASH.
POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/05/guns-in-theunited-states-one-for-every-man-woman-and-child-and-then-some/?utm_term=.7fa1031d06f1
[https://perma.cc/9HNY-84E7].
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by civilians.258 Forty-two of these states impose little or no restrictions on
who can carry these weapons or where they can carry them.259 The
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent recognition of a fundamental right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense further colors the changing national
landscape and conversation surrounding the public possession of
firearms.260
This changing landscape poses obvious and significant challenges for
police officers, who have traditionally initiated lawful stops and frisks of
publicly armed individuals on the assumption that a crime was being
committed by a dangerous person. That assumption seems increasingly
unreliable. In this brave new world, officers should develop other indicia
of suspected criminality beyond mere gun possession to satisfy the
“reasonable suspicion” of criminality standard to initiate a stop under
Terry. But once that lawful stop has been initiated, officers should have
the right to automatically frisk and disarm a public gun carrier, regardless
of the suspected dangerousness of the individual, in recognition of the
need to protect the officer and nearby public from the possible use of the
inherently dangerous and destructive firearm.
In making these recommendations, the author recognizes that “the
framework described above would place a unique burden on handgun
carriers,”261 one that should receive careful scrutiny in light of the
framework’s infringement on recognized Second Amendment rights and
the intrusion into the “sanctity of the person” entailed by frisks. But while
the abridgement of constitutional rights should not be taken lightly, the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for personal protection
does not (yet) encompass the right to be free from inquiries regarding
firearms, pat downs and other temporary searches to identify the presence
of firearms, or even brief relinquishment of firearms during the course of
a lawful investigatory stop.262
258. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (“Every state–as well as the
District of Columbia–allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.”).
259. Id. (listing twelve states where no permit is required, fifteen “no discretion” shall issue states,
and fifteen “limited discretion” shall issue states).
260. See section II.C.2.
261. Bellin, supra note 20, at 42.
262. Miller, supra note 100, at 1295 (“Part of the problem is Heller’s imprecision on what it means
by ‘self-defense.’”); cf. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding
that Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the
home . . . . To put it simply, concealed carry per se does not fall outside the scope of the right to bear
arms; but insistence upon a particular mode of carry does”); Bellin, supra note 20, at 30 (“Expanding
gun rights also restrict the actions police can take when interacting with armed citizens. The
widespread assumption in urban areas that armed people can be, at least temporarily, disarmed during
police encounters may no longer hold sway in a post-Heller world.”).
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Moreover, the exercise of one’s Second Amendment right inherently
carries with it the exercise of enormous power. The right to carry a loaded
firearm gives an individual the right to carry an instrument designed to
inflict incredible damage and with the ability of ending numerous lives in
a matter of seconds.263 Moreover, because the exercise of one’s Second
Amendment right includes carrying a loaded firearm, the Constitution
grants an individual the right to carry an instrument designed to inflict
incredible damage and capable of ending numerous lives in a matter of
seconds. The exercise of this right inherently carries with it the exercise
of enormous power, and “with great power comes great responsibility.”264
Part of that responsibility ought to include, at a minimum, the ability of a
peace officer to protect herself and the public by frisking, temporarily
disarming, and determining the dangerousness of the individual
exercising the right. A civilian relying on police officers to maintain their
safety in public should demand no less.

263. McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (“[A] gun is an article that is typically
and characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one,
and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous . . . .”); United States v.
Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (characterizing a “loaded gun [as] by any measure
an inherently dangerous weapon”); Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing “the substantial risk of danger and the inherently violent nature of firearms”); Love v.
Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing “the inherently violent nature of firearms,
and the danger firearms pose to all members of society”); United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 40 (2nd
Cir. 1997) (“[F]irearms are inherently dangerous devices . . . .”).
264. Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for
Clarification, U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 426 (2008) (“The power to take another human life” with a
firearm entails with it enormous responsibility).

